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Consumers increasingly rely on user-generated online reviews when making
purchase decisions. However, the ease of posting reviews online, potentially
anonymously, raises questions about whether unscrupulous business may be
posting deceptive opinion spam—fraudulent or fictitious reviews that have been
deliberately written to sound authentic, in order to deceive the reader. Unfortu-
nately, as this thesis demonstrates, people are largely unable to identify decep-
tive opinion spam. Accordingly, it is challenging to obtain deceptive reviews
for study, and, moreover, very little is known about the prevalence of deception
among online reviews.
This thesis presents the first thorough investigation of deceptive opinion
spam in online review communities. First, we present a novel approach for
obtaining deceptive opinion spam, based on crowdsourcing, which we apply
to obtain 1,280 known (gold standard) deceptive reviews of hotels and restau-
rants. After confirming that people are poor judges of deceptive reviews, we
then present results showing that supervised Machine Learning text classifiers
can be trained to detect deceptive opinion spam with nearly 90% accuracy in
some settings, far surpassing human detection performance. Next, we explore
linguistic features associated with deceptive reviews, and compare these fea-
tures across three contextual dimensions, including the sentiment of the review
(positive vs. negative), the domain of the review (hotel vs. restaurant), and the
domain expertise of the reviewer (crowdsourced workers vs. hotel employees).
Finally, we present a Bayesian framework for estimating the prevalence of de-
ception among online reviews, based on the predictions made by our Machine
Learning text classifiers. Applying this framework to six online hotel review
communities, we present the first empirical estimates of the rates of deception
among online hotel reviews, and additionally evaluate the efficacy of increasing
review posting costs to reduce the prevalence of deceptive opinion spam.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Obtaining and evaluating the opinions of others is an important step in many
decision making processes. For example, people regularly seek the opinions
of friends and family when faced with situations ranging from important life
decisions, to choosing which businesses to patronize; politicians poll the opin-
ions of their electorate to help inform their policies; and companies survey the
opinions of their customers to discover how best to improve their offerings.
And with the rise of social media, people increasingly inform their decisions
with opinions and other information obtained from the Web. For example, con-
sumers today rely on user-generated online reviews when making purchase de-
cisions [18, 46]; politicians and political pundits look to social media to gain
insights into public opinion [41, 101]; and researchers are exploring ways to use
social media to predict a variety of real-world outcomes [135], including stock
prices [8, 37, 110], election results [83, 122], public health [21, 92] and movie box-
office revenues [3], with potential to impact business decisions in a number of
industries.1
1.1 Opinion Spam
Unfortunately, the ease of posting content to the Web via social media, poten-
tially anonymously, combined with the public’s trust and growing reliance on
opinions and other information found online, creates opportunities and incen-
tives for abuse. Abuse of social media, or social spam, can include spreading
misinformation and rumors [15, 68, 75, 100], inflammatory speech [127, 133],
1Note, however, that claims that social media can predict real-world outcomes are not with-
out controversy; cf. Gayo-Avello [36] or Wong et al. [130].
1
blog spam [74] and social phishing [47]. This dissertation investigates social
spam of online reviews of products and services, for which Jindal and Liu [48]
have coined the term opinion spam.2 Opinion spam can range from advertise-
ments and promotions of unrelated products or services, to fraudulent or fake
reviews that are intended to deceive the reader.
While other kinds of spam have received considerable research atten-
tion, regrettably there has been little work to date on opinion spam. Fur-
thermore, most previous work in the area has focused on the detection of
disruptive opinion spam—uncontroversial instances of spam that are easily
identified by a human reader, for example, advertisements, questions, and other
irrelevant or non-opinion text [48]. And while the presence of disruptive opin-
ion spam is certainly a nuisance, the risk it poses to the user is minimal, since
they can always choose to ignore it.
Instead, this dissertation focuses on a potentially more insidious type of
opinion spam called deceptive opinion spam—fraudulent or fictitious opin-
ions that have been deliberately written to sound authentic, in order to deceive
the reader [88]. Unlike other kinds of spam, such as Web [14, 38] and e-mail
spam [24, 119], deceptive opinion spam is neither easily ignored nor even iden-
tified by a human reader (see Section 3.3.2). For example, observe the diffi-
culty in distinguishing between the following two hotel reviews, one of which
is truthful and the other of which is deceptive opinion spam:
• “I have stayed at many hotels traveling for both business and pleasure and I can
honestly stay that The James is tops. The service at the hotel is first class. The
rooms are modern and very comfortable. The location is perfect within walking
distance to all of the great sights and restaurants. Highly recommend to both
2As a matter of convenience, the terms opinion and review are used interchangeably to refer
to online reviews, which are the focus of this dissertation. Nevertheless, it is our hope that the
material presented here should apply not just to reviews, but to other kinds of opinions as well.
2
business travellers and couples.”
• “My husband and I stayed at the James Chicago Hotel for our anniversary. This
place is fantastic! We knew as soon as we arrived we made the right choice! The
rooms are BEAUTIFUL and the staff very attentive and wonderful!! The area of
the hotel is great, since I love to shop I couldn’t ask for more!! We will definatly
[sic] be back to Chicago and we will for sure be back to the James Chicago.”
Answer: see footnote.3
Deceptive opinion spam can be both highly influential and highly dam-
aging, because even a small number of fake reviews can impact a business’
revenue, for example, if the business’ average review rating is on a rat-
ing boundary [2, 65]. Moreover, incentives to post deceptive opinion spam
are growing. First, consumers increasingly rely on reviews and other in-
formation found online to make or reinforce purchase decisions [18, 46],
and are reluctant to purchase a product or service offering if it has few re-
views [85, 138]. Accordingly, businesses have incentive to post fake posi-
tive reviews, or positive deceptive opinion spam, to promote or hype their
own offerings. On the other hand, online consumers also increasingly re-
port changing their purchase decisions based on negative review information
found online [18], and some work suggests that negative opinions may be
weighted more heavily by consumers compared to positive opinions [60, 91,
116].4 Thus, businesses also have incentive to post fake negative reviews, or
negative deceptive opinion spam, to disparage or slander competitor’s offer-
ings, and to drive additional business towards their own offerings.
Unfortunately, because manual annotation of deceptive opinion spam is un-
reliable, there are few good sources of labeled deceptive opinion spam data for
3The second example review is deceptive opinion spam.
4Note that other work has found the consumers do not weight negative opinions more heav-
ily than positive opinions; cf. Ong [85].
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research. In the absence of gold standard labeled data, related studies have re-
lied on ad hoc data annotation and evaluation procedures, for example, careful
manual annotation, using duplicated or plagiarized reviews, or relying on noisy
behavioral indicators of deception (see Section 2.2.2 for an overview). In con-
trast, one contribution of this dissertation is the construction of the first large-
scale, publicly available5 corpus of gold standard deceptive opinion spam,
containing 1,280 deceptive reviews of hotels and restaurants, including a mix of
positive (4- or 5-star) and negative (1- or 2-star) deceptive opinion spam, as well
as domain expert deceptive opinion spam written by hotel employees.
We discuss the construction of this corpus in Chapter 2. In particular, rather
than annotate existing opinions as truthful or deceptive, we instead pay peo-
ple to write deceptive reviews of specific hotels and restaurants, as if they were
customers. This approach has several advantages. First, it obviates the need to
label the resulting data, because the opinions obtained through this approach
are, by construction, deceptive opinion spam. Second, this approach mirrors
one of the ways in which real-world deception occurs, for example, as in the re-
cent case of a Belkin employee who hired people to write and post fake positive
reviews for an otherwise poorly reviewed Belkin product [72].
Using this novel, gold standard corpus, this dissertation presents the first
thorough investigation of deceptive opinion spam in online review commu-
nities through three broad questions:
1. Detection: Is the language of deceptive opinions different from that of
truthful opinions, and if so, what are these differences, and can they be
used to detect deceptive opinion spam? (Chapter 3)
2. Context: How is deceptive opinion spam influenced by the context of the
5The data used in this dissertation is available from: http://www.cs.cornell.edu/
˜myleott/op_spam.
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deception, and how important is modeling this context when detecting
deceptive opinion spam? (Chapter 4)
3. Prevalence: What is the prevalence of deceptive opinion spam among on-
line reviews, what factors influence this prevalence, and what measures,
if any, can be taken to reduce this prevalence? (Chapter 5)
1.2 Detecting Deceptive Opinion Spam
“The words people use in their daily lives can reveal important aspects of
their social and psychological worlds.”—James W. Pennebaker et al. [97]
A person’s language can be used to predict many of their hidden social
and psychological attributes, for example, their gender [12, 57, 76, 112], iden-
tity [31, 69, 93, 102], location [26, 25, 43], demographics [27, 80, 103], native
language [58], political orientation [19, 95, 103], personality traits [66], sen-
timent [64, 90], emotional state [17], and deception [73, 78, 136, 137].6 In
Chapter 3, we explore whether language can also predict, or detect, whether
an opinion is deceptive opinion spam through three questions:
1. Human Performance: How effective are human judges at detecting de-
ceptive opinion spam?
2. Machine Learning Performance: Can Machine Learning classifiers be
trained to automatically detect deceptive opinion spam?
3. Linguistic Cues: What are the linguistic cues to deceptive opinion spam,
and how do they relate to linguistic cues to other kinds of deception?
6While previous work has found that language features can sometimes predict deception [73,
78, 136, 137], it is unknown, a priori, whether those same techniques and language features used
in previous work will apply to deceptive opinion spam.
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We approach these questions through a binary classification task, in which
the objective is to classify a given review as either DECEPTIVE (deceptive opin-
ion spam) or TRUTHFUL (not deceptive opinion spam).7 This task is additionally
restricted so that classification decisions must be based only on the text of each
review. This restriction is realistic, because other attributes of a review, such
as the date, IP address of the poster, or number of other reviews posted by the
same user, are all controlled or easily manipulated by a spammer. For exam-
ple, a spammer may hire people with genuine accounts to post their deceptive
opinion spam, as in the Belkin example [72], or engage in sockpuppetry—a social
spamming technique, popular in political contexts [71, 70, 104], in which many
fake online user accounts are created in order to “follow,” “like,” or otherwise
endorse and lend credibility to a particular person, group, institution or cause.
We first evaluate the ability of human judges to detect deception, which is
important for two reasons. First, there are few other baselines for this classi-
fication task; indeed, related studies [48, 73] have only considered a random
guess baseline. Second, assessing human performance is necessary to validate
the quality of the deceptive opinion spam corpus constructed in Chapter 2. For
example, if human detection performance is found to be low, then the deceptive
opinions must be convincing, and are, therefore, deserving of further attention.
In general, we find that human judgements: (a) are truth biased, in that they
are more likely to predict TRUTHFUL than DECEPTIVE; and (b) rarely predict
deception better than chance, consistent with decades of traditional deception
research in psychology [9].
Next, we explore whether Machine Learning and Natural Language Pro-
cessing techniques can be applied to detect deceptive opinion spam. In par-
7This same setup has been used to study spam in other contexts, for example, e-mail, com-
ment and Web spam (see Section 3.2), where the objective, similarly, is to classify content as
SPAM or NOT-SPAM.
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ticular, we recast the task as a standard supervised binary classification task, in
which a classifier is trained by a Machine Learning algorithm on a set of labeled
reviews, and is later used to classify a set of unseen test reviews. We evalu-
ate the performance of two Machine Learning algorithms, popular in related
work [48, 73, 137]—Support Vector Machine (SVM) and Naı¨ve Bayes—and ad-
ditionally compare the relative utility of three potentially complementary fram-
ings of this task. Specifically, we view this task as:
1. A standard text categorization task, in which classifiers are trained with
content n-gram features [49, 114];
2. An instance of psycholinguistic deception detection, in which deceptive state-
ments exemplify the psychological effects of lying, such as increased neg-
ative emotion and psychological distancing [39, 78]; and
3. A problem of genre identification, in which deceptive and truthful reviews
are considered to be sub-genres of imaginative (fiction) and informative
(non-fiction) writing, respectively [5, 105].
Using a nested cross-validation procedure [123] to estimate the performance of
each classifier, we find that classifiers trained on features traditionally employed
in: (a) psychological studies of deception and (b) genre identification, are both
outperformed at statistically significant levels by a content n-gram–based text
categorization approach. Notably, we find that classifiers trained with n-gram
features can, in some experiments, detect deceptive opinion spam with accura-
cies approaching 90%, or well beyond the capabilities of human judges.
Finally, we explore possible linguistic cues to deception by deeper inspection
of the best-performing Machine Learning classifiers. We find, for example, that
spatial details are often predictive of TRUTHFUL reviews, suggesting that liars
have difficulty encoding spatial information into their deceptions, consistent
7
with theories of reality monitoring and past deception research [51, 52]. How-
ever, we also find, for example, that first-person singular use is predictive of
DECEPTIVE reviews, in contrast to several previous studies of deception [39, 78].
Taken together, our findings confirm the existence of linguistic cues to deceptive
opinion spam, but also underscore the importance of considering the context
underlying a deception, which is addressed further in Chapter 4.
1.3 The Effects of Context on Deceptive Opinion Spam
Deception has been studied in many settings, or contexts, with varying circum-
stances, stakes and motivations to deceive, as well as across modalities, such
as visual, spoken, written, face-to-face and computer-mediated communication
(see Vrij [124] for an overview). However, it has been challenging to identify
cues to deception that apply universally across these contexts [39, 78, 124]. In-
deed, some researchers now argue that cues to deception depend on the context
of the deception, and therefore, approaches to detecting deception must addi-
tionally model the contextual parameters underlying each deception [7, 78, 124].
In Chapter 4, we investigate the generalizability of the Machine Learning
classifiers in Chapter 3, by measuring the influence that the context of a de-
ception has on classification performance. Specifically, we consider deceptive
opinion spam across three contextual dimensions:
1. Sentiment: Do linguistic cues to deceptive opinion spam vary with the
sentiment of an opinion, and if so, what influence does the sentiment of an
opinion have on Machine Learning classification performance?
2. Domain: Do linguistic cues to deceptive opinion spam vary with the
domain, or topic, of a review, and if so, how important is it that Machine
8
Learning classifiers are trained and evaluated on data of the same domain?
3. Domain Expertise: Do authors with expert-level domain knowledge, or
domain experts, produce deceptive opinion spam with language that is dif-
ferent from that of non-experts, and if so, how can we detect deceptive
opinion spam written by domain experts?
First, we consider differences between positive- and negative-sentiment de-
ceptive opinion spam. Here, we train and test Machine Learning classifiers on
reviews of opposite sentiments (OPPOSITE-SENT), and find that classification
performance is significantly worse, compared to classifiers that are trained and
tested on reviews of the same sentiment (SAME-SENT). However, when we train
classifiers on reviews of both sentiments, jointly (JOINT-SENT), we find that per-
formance can be competitive with the SAME-SENT classifiers. We then compare
linguistic cues to deception across sentiments, and find that the biggest differ-
ence is in emotion terms; in particular, DECEPTIVE reviews seem to exaggerate
the underlying review sentiment, relative to TRUTHFUL reviews.
Second, we explore the sensitivity of the Machine Learning classifiers,
trained in Chapter 3, to the domain, or topic, of a review. Specifically, we train
deception classifiers on reviews from one domain (HOTELS), and evaluate their
ability to detect deceptive reviews from another domain (RESTAURANTS). We
find that classification performance suffers significantly when the training and
test domains differ. We also find, however, that we can leverage out-of-domain
training data (e.g., HOTEL reviews), in combination with the in-domain train-
ing data (e.g., RESTAURANT reviews), to improve the accuracy of our models,
compared to using just the in-domain training data.
Finally, we investigate how deceptive opinion spam is influenced by the do-
main expertise of the reviewer. For example, we find in Chapter 3 that deceptive
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hotel reviews written by crowdsourced workers are easy to detect, in part, be-
cause they lack spatial details. Accordingly, we obtain deceptive opinion spam
from hotel employees, who are domain experts in the hotels domain, and who
have considerable spatial knowledge of their own hotels. We compare these re-
views to both non-expert DECEPTIVE reviews and TRUTHFUL reviews, and find
that the three kinds of reviews are linguistically distinct. Moreover, Machine
Learning classifiers can distinguish between the three classes with nearly 70%
accuracy, or between any two out of three classes with close to 80% accuracy.
1.4 Estimating the Prevalence of Deceptive Opinion Spam
And while detection is an important task, relatively little is known about the
actual prevalence, or rate, of deceptive opinion spam in online review communi-
ties, or the factors that influence it. In Chapter 5, using the Machine Learning
classifiers trained in Chapter 3, we investigate the prevalence of deceptive opin-
ion spam in online review communities through three questions:
1. Prevalence Estimation: In the absence of gold standard annotations, can
we use a noisy deception classifier to estimate the prevalence of deceptive
opinion spam in a review community?
2. Influencing Factors: What factors influence the prevalence of deception
in a review community?
3. Prevalence Reduction: What actions, if any, can be taken to reduce the
prevalence of deception in a review community?
To answer these questions, we present a general framework for estimating
the prevalence of deceptive opinion spam in an online review community, based
on the Machine Learning classifiers trained in Chapter 3. Specifically, given
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a noisy deception classifier that distinguishes DECEPTIVE and TRUTHFUL re-
views, and inspired by studies of disease prevalence [53, 54], we present the
Bayesian Prevalence Model—a generative model of deception that jointly mod-
els the classifier’s uncertainty, as well as the ground-truth deceptiveness of each
review. Inference for this model, which is performed via Gibbs sampling, allows
us to estimate bounds on the prevalence of deception in the underlying review
community, without requiring gold standard annotations of deception.
We then present a theoretical component to this framework, based on sig-
naling theory from economics [117], and use it to reason about the factors that
influence deception prevalence in online review communities. In particular, we
argue that reviews are signals to the true, unknown quality of a product or ser-
vice offering, and act to diminish the information asymmetry between past and
prospective customers [44]. Accordingly, deceptive opinion spam is a false sig-
nal, and the prevalence of deception among online reviews is therefore a func-
tion of the costs and benefits associated with posting fake reviews.
We first consider the benefits associated with posting deceptive opinion
spam. Here, because the spammer presumably has some vested interest in post-
ing their review, the benefit of the review is derived directly from the existence
and dissemination of that review. For example, a hotel that posts a deceptive
positive review of their own property is benefited when that review is read
and relied upon by a prospective customer. Moreover, this exposure benefit
is proportional to the size of the review community’s audience. Therefore, we
hypothesize that deception will be more prevalent in review communities with
a high exposure benefit, such as highly trafficked communities, compared to sites
with low exposure benefit, for example, communities with low traffic.
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We next consider the costs associated with posting deceptive opinion spam.
Here, we consider only the posting cost, or the direct monetary and time costs
associated with posting a review in a review community. Posting costs vary by
review community, with some communities verifying purchases before allow-
ing reviews to be posted, and others hiding or filtering reviews written by new
or inexperienced reviewers. We hypothesize that review communities that im-
plement these costs, i.e., communities with a high posting cost, will contain less
deceptive opinion spam compared to communities with a low posting cost.
Finally, we apply the Bayesian Prevalence Model to produce the first empir-
ical estimates of the prevalence of deception in six popular online hotel review
communities: Expedia, Hotels.com, Orbitz, Priceline, TripAdvisor and Yelp.8
The results confirm our hypotheses that deception is most prevalent in com-
munities with low posting costs and high exposure benefits. Moreover, we find
that when actions are taken to increase a community’s posting cost, for example,
hiding a user’s reviews until they have posted a minimum number of reviews,
there are dramatic reductions in the estimated rates of deceptive opinion spam
in that community. Lastly, we find that rates of deception in communities with
a low posting cost are growing over time, approaching a maximum estimate of
∼6% in August 2011, further emphasizing the importance of increased review
posting costs.
1.5 Contributions and Roadmap
In Chapter 2, we introduce the first large-scale corpus of gold standard deceptive
opinion spam, containing 1,280 deceptive reviews of hotels and restaurants, in-
8URLs for the six sites are, respectively: Expedia.com, Hotels.com, Orbitz.com,
Priceline.com, TripAdvisor.com and Yelp.com.
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cluding a mix of positive-sentiment (4- or 5-star) and negative-sentiment (1-
or 2-star) deceptive opinion spam, as well as domain expert deceptive opinion
spam written by hotel employees.
In Chapter 3, we use our novel corpus to present the first evaluation of hu-
man and Machine Learning performance at detecting gold standard deceptive
opinion spam. We find that humans are poor judges of deceptive opinion spam,
and rarely predict deception better than chance. In contrast, we find that Ma-
chine Learning classifiers trained on n-gram features can, in some experiments,
detect deceptive opinion spam with accuracies approaching 90%.
In Chapter 4, we present the first in-depth analysis of the influence of several
contextual factors—such as the sentiment of a review, the domain of a review, and
the domain expertise of the reviewer—on the ability of Machine Learning classi-
fiers to detect deceptive opinion spam. We find that while individual cues to
deception vary according to the context of the review, we can train Machine
Learning classifiers on reviews from several contexts to learn models of decep-
tive opinion spam that better generalize across contexts.
In Chapter 5, we introduce an approach for estimating the prevalence of de-
ception in an online review community, based on the output of our Machine
Learning classifiers. We apply our approach to six large-scale collections of on-
line reviews of hotels, and present the first empirical estimates of the preva-
lence of deceptive opinion spam among online hotel reviews. We further use
our model to study the economic incentives and reputational risks associated
with posting fake reviews, and show that by increasing review posting costs,
we may be able to reduce the prevalence of deceptive opinion spam.
Finally, we conclude and present directions for future work in Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 2
OBTAINING LABELED DATA
2.1 Introduction
A central challenge to studying deceptive opinion spam, and deception, in gen-
eral, is that it is difficult to obtain labeled data, or data with reliable annota-
tions indicating whether each message is truthful or deceptive. Previous work
in the deception literature has relied on sanctioned deception in laboratory set-
tings, or unsanctioned deception based on self-report or incentivized lying (see
Section 2.2.1). In the context of deceptive opinion spam, recent work has in-
stead relied on various non-gold standard data annotation or evaluation proce-
dures, for example, careful manual annotation, heuristic annotation, or unlabeled ap-
proaches that rely on noisy behavioral indicators of deception (see Section 2.2.2).
This dissertation presents a novel approach for creating a corpus of gold
standard deceptive opinion spam based on crowdsourcing, in which a large
group of online workers are paid to write deceptive opinion spam for specific
hotels and restaurants, as if they were customers (see Section 2.3). This ap-
proach has several advantages. First, data obtained in this way does not need
to be labeled as DECEPTIVE or TRUTHFUL, because the crowdsourced reviews
are DECEPTIVE by construction. Second, this approach is realistic, because de-
ceptive opinion spam has been previously crowdsourced by businesses in real-
world settings, for example, the Belkin case [72]. Third, this approach relies on
online workers, who are easier to find in large numbers and are more represen-
tative of the general population, compared to university student participants
often employed in studies of deception [4, 45, 109, 113].
Unfortunately, crowdsourcing is not appropriate for obtaining certain kinds
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of data needed in this dissertation. For example, Section 4.4 requires decep-
tive opinion spam written by people with expert-level domain knowledge, or
domain experts, who may not be present or may be difficult to identify in
crowdsourcing marketplaces. Accordingly, we have built a novel dataset of de-
ceptive opinion spam by soliciting reviews directly from hotel employees, who
have expert-level domain knowledge of the HOTELS domain, in general, and of
their own hotels, specifically (see Section 2.4).
Crowdsourcing is also an imperfect choice for obtaining TRUTHFUL reviews
of specific hotels and restaurants, which are required throughout this disserta-
tion. In particular, TRUTHFUL reviews need to be written by past customers of
the hotels and restaurants of interest, and it is difficult to crowdsource workers
who are qualified to write such reviews truthfully. Instead, we gather publicly
available reviews found on six popular review websites, and sample from them
a subset of reviews that are likely to be TRUTHFUL, based on characteristics of
the user, and the hotel or restaurant (see Section 2.5).
2.2 Challenges and Related Approaches
Related work has relied on a number of approaches for obtaining labeled data
to study deception. Section 2.2.1 discusses some of the approaches used in the
deception literature in psychology. Section 2.2.2 discusses some of the non-gold
standard approaches recently introduced by researchers specifically to study
deceptive opinion spam, in the absence of gold standard labeled data.
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2.2.1 Traditional Approaches
Studies of deception in the psychological literature have relied on a number of
approaches for obtaining labeled deceptive data. These approaches typically
fall into one of two categories, depending on whether deceptions are obtained:
(a) at the direction or explicit request of a researcher, called sanctioned lie ap-
proaches; or (b) without any explicit instruction or permission from a researcher,
called unsanctioned lie approaches. This section discusses some of the advantages
and disadvantages of each kind of approach.
Sanctioned Lie Approaches
Lies that are told at the direction or explicit request of a researcher are called
sanctioned lies. Traditional studies of deception often rely on sanctioned lies to
obtain labeled deceptive data. For example, a researcher may ask a participant
to lie about their emotional state [28]; or their personal stance on a given topic,
such as abortion or the death penalty [73]; or their behavior, for example, a
participant may be asked to lie after committing a mock crime [98].
In general, sanctioned lie approaches are advantageous in that they provide
researchers with freedom and control over the circumstances and topic of each
deception. Accordingly, sanctioned lies can be carefully solicited to allow for
comparison with non-deceptive data. However, by sanctioning a lie, the re-
searcher is implicitly endorsing the deception, which influences the psycholog-
ical effects of lying [30, 35, 78]. Moreover, participants in studies of sanctioned
lies are often unrepresentative of the general population, for example, when
they consist primarily of university students [113].
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Unsanctioned Lie Approaches
A second category of approaches rely on unsanctioned lies, or lies that are told
without any explicit instruction or permission from the researcher. Because un-
sanctioned lies are not explicitly solicited, and may include real-world lies, stud-
ies of deception that rely on unsanctioned lies require additional effort to label
the data, compared to studies of sanctioned lies. Unsanctioned lies can be la-
beled in a number of ways.
The first approach to labeling unsanctioned lies is through self-report, where
participants are asked to identify their lies, retrospectively. This approach in-
cludes diary and survey studies, where participants are either asked to keep
a diary record of their lies, or are surveyed about they lying habits. Unfor-
tunately, while self-report methods may better capture real-world deceptions,
participants can under-report deception through this approach, for example, if
they fail to remember, or are embarrassed to report all of their lies. Moreover,
because the labeling is done retrospectively, the data available about each lie
may be minimal, unless the researcher is able to record the original communi-
cations, for example, in studies of digital deception [6, 40].
The second approach to labeling unsanctioned lies is through incentivized ly-
ing procedures [30, 61], where participants are not explicitly asked to lie, but are
incentivized to do so in a setting where the researcher can definitively identify
and label the lie. This approach is advantageous in that incentivized lies are
unsanctioned, but do not rely on self-report for labeling. However, incentivized
lying experiments can be challenging to setup and produce variable amounts of
data, since only a fraction of participants may succumb to the incentive to lie.
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Limitations
Unfortunately, the sanctioned and unsanctioned lie approaches just discussed
are impractical for obtaining large-scale collections of deceptive opinion spam.
First, unsanctioned lie approaches that rely on self-reports of deception are un-
likely to succeed in settings where the risks of getting caught are high, for ex-
ample, posting deceptive opinion spam.1 Second, the sanctioned lie and in-
centivized lying approaches just discussed typically require laboratory environ-
ments, which are challenging to setup in large-scale settings, such as the Web. In
Section 2.3, we present a novel sanctioned lie approach for collecting deceptive
opinion spam that relies on crowdsourcing instead of a laboratory environment.
2.2.2 Non-Gold Standard Approaches
Researchers have recently proposed several approaches for studying deceptive
opinion spam in the absence of gold standard deceptive data. These approaches
can be broken up into three categories, depending on whether the approach
relies on: (a) manual annotation of deceptive instances in the data; (b) heuristic
methods for deriving approximate, but non-gold standard deception labels; or (c)
unlabeled data, by making assumptions about the effects of deceptive behavior.
Manual Annotations
Some recent work studying deceptive opinion spam has suggested relying on
manual annotations of deception, assigned by human judges.
Lim et al. [63] study deceptive product reviews found on Amazon.com. They
develop a sophisticated software interface for manually labeling reviews as de-
1The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has recently updated their guidelines on the use of
endorsements and testimonials in advertising to suggest that posting deceptive opinion spam
may be unlawful in the United States [29].
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ceptive or truthful. The interface allows annotators to view all of each user’s re-
views, ranked according to dimensions potentially of importance to identifying
deception, such as whether the review is duplicated, or whether the reviewer
has authored many reviews of the same product group (e.g., brand) in a short
period of time and with all very-high or all very-low ratings.
Wu et al. [131] study deceptive online reviews of TripAdvisor hotels by man-
ually labeling a set of reviews according to “suspiciousness.” This manually la-
beled dataset is then used to validate eight proposed characteristics of deceptive
hotels. The proposed characteristics include features based on the number of
reviews written by novice reviewers, as well as the differences between review
ratings left by novice and experienced reviewers.
Li et al. [62] study deceptive product reviews found on Epinions.com. They
rank reviews by user-provided helpfulness ratings, and then sample three sets
of reviews from the top, middle and bottom of this ranked list. Finally, they
have 10 college students manually label reviews in each sample, according to a
set of tips found online for spotting fake reviews.
Mukherjee et al. [77] study groups of users who post deceptive product re-
views on Amazon.com. They use a frequent itemset mining approach to select
candidate “spammer groups,” containing users that have posted reviews for at
least three of the same products. Candidate spammer groups are then labeled
by eight human judges according to a predetermined list of “spamming indica-
tors” obtained from the Web.
Limitations Manual annotation of deception is problematic for a number of
reasons. First, many of the same challenges that face manual annotation efforts
in other domains also apply to annotations of deception. For example, man-
ual annotations can be expensive to obtain, especially in large-scale settings,
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such as the Web. Most seriously however, is that human ability to detect decep-
tion is notoriously poor [9]. Indeed, we find in Section 3.3 that human agree-
ment and deception detection performance is often no better than chance; this
is especially the case when considering the overtrusting nature of most human
judges—a phenomenon referred to in the psychological deception literature as
a truth bias [9, 124].
Heuristically Labeled
A second category of approaches for studying deceptive opinion spam rely on
approximate, or heuristic labels, of deception.
Jindal and Liu [48] study the characteristics of deceptive Amazon.com re-
views. They rely on an approach for heuristically labeling reviews as deceptive,
based on a set of assumptions specific to their domain. In particular, after re-
moving irrelevant content, including questions and advertisements, they label
as deceptive all duplicated reviews, or reviews where the text heavily overlaps
with the text of other reviews in the same corpus.
Feng et al. [32, 33] study deceptive reviews of hotels on TripAdvisor.com.
Following the approach outlined in Chapter 3 and originally proposed in Ott et
al. [88], they train Machine Learning classifiers to detect deceptive opinion spam
based on the text of each review. However, they additionally consider training
and testing their classifiers on heuristically-labeled reviews, which they label
according to three hypotheses about deceptive hotels: (a) The average rating
assigned by novice (singleton) reviewers will be greater than expert reviewers
among deceptive hotels; (b) The ratio of strongly positive to strongly negative
reviews among novice reviewers, compared to the same ratio computed among
experienced reviewers, will be greater among deceptive hotels; and (c) If the
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average rating among a hotel’s reviews in one month is very different from the
average rating of that same hotel in the previous and following months, then
that hotel is more likely to be deceptive.
Limitations Heuristic labeling approaches do not produce a true gold stan-
dard corpus, but for some domains may offer an acceptable approximation.
However, as with other non-gold standard approaches, certain behaviors might
have other, innocent causes. For example, duplicated reviews may have been
duplicated accidentally; and even if a review is duplicated maliciously, that does
not mean that the original review was deceptive. Moreover, duplicated reviews
are potentially better identified via traditional plagiarism or near-duplicate de-
tection techniques [10]. Similarly, novice or singleton reviewers are not neces-
sarily deceptive, and may post more extreme ratings for legitimate reasons. For
example, someone that has an extremely great or horrible experience may be
more likely to open a new account on a review website and share that experi-
ence, compared to someone who has an average or mediocre experience.
Unlabeled Approaches
A third category of approaches for studying deceptive opinion spam are
unlabeled approaches, which rely on the effects of deceptive behavior, rather
than trying to label individual messages as deceptive.
Wu et al. [132] propose a novel strategy for evaluating hypotheses about de-
ceptive hotel reviews found on TripAdvisor, based on distortions of popularity
rankings. Specifically, they test the Proportion of Positive Singletons and Concen-
tration of Positive Singletons hypotheses of Wu et al. [131], but instead of using
manually-derived labels, they test their hypotheses through the corresponding
change in a hotel’s ranking when these “suspicious reviews” are deleted, com-
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pared to deleting random reviews.
Mayzlin et al. [67] reason about the economic incentives for posting decep-
tive hotel reviews by comparing a hotel’s rating distribution on TripAdvisor,
where anyone can create an account and post a review, to the same hotels’ rat-
ing distribution on Expedia, where a verified purchase is required before a user
can post a review. In particular, they apply a difference of differences approach
to control for factors specific to each review community, and then explore three
hypotheses relating to the incentives of various types of hotels to post decep-
tive opinion spam: (a) independent hotels are more likely to engage in review
manipulation than branded chain hotels; (b) small owner hotels are more likely
to engage in review manipulation than large owner hotels; and (c) hotels with a
small management company are more likely to engage in review manipulation
than hotels with a large management company.
Limitations The biggest drawback of unlabeled approaches is that they do not
study deception directly, but must instead infer deception based on the effects of
the deceptive behavior. Accordingly, unlabeled approaches must take great care
in making assumptions about the effects of deception, in order for the results
to be valid. Nevertheless, when care is taken in making these assumptions,
unlabeled approaches are useful for validating hypotheses about deception, in
the absence of labeled data.
2.3 Crowdsourcing Deception
This section presents a novel approach for creating a corpus of gold standard de-
ceptive opinion spam based on crowdsourcing. Crowdsourcing is defined as,
“the practice of obtaining needed services, ideas, or content by soliciting contri-
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butions from a large group of people and especially from the online community
rather than from traditional employees or suppliers” [20]. Recently, crowdsourc-
ing services, such as Amazon’s Mechanical Turk,2 have gained popularity by
making large-scale data annotation and collection efforts easy and financially
affordable, by granting researchers access to a marketplace of anonymous on-
line workers willing to complete small tasks.
As with traditional sanctioned lie approaches (see Section 2.2.1), crowd-
sourcing deception involves explicitly asking people to lie. However, while
traditional sanctioned lie approaches typically rely on academic laboratory en-
vironments to obtain data, the crowdsourcing approach presented here relies on
online workers from Mechanical Turk, who are easier to find in large numbers
and are more representative of the general population, compared to university
students [4, 45, 109, 113].
Yet, despite these advantages, crowdsourcing is not yet commonly used in
the deception literature, and the work presented in this section is among the first
academic applications of crowdsourcing to the task of obtaining gold standard
deceptive content. Notably, Mihalcea and Strapparava [73] previously used Me-
chanical Turk to obtain deceptive content by asking hundreds of Mechanical
Turk workers to give their true and untrue personal stances on social issues,
such as abortion and the death penalty; however, their work does not consider
deceptive online reviews, as investigated here.
The rest of this section is organized as follows. In Section 2.3.1, we collect 400
gold standard positive-sentiment (4- or 5-star) deceptive opinion spam reviews
of 20 popular Chicago hotels, which we use in Chapter 3 to test the abilities
of human judges and Machine Learning classifiers to detect deceptive opinion
spam. In Section 2.3.2, we collect a matching set of 400 gold standard negative-
2Amazon Mechanical Turk: http://MTurk.com.
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“Imagine you work for the marketing department of a hotel. Your boss asks
you to write a fake review for the hotel (as if you were a customer) to be
posted on a travel review website. The review needs to sound realistic
and portray the hotel in a positive light. Look at their website if you are
not familiar with the hotel.”
Figure 2.1: The Mechanical Turk prompt used to solicit positive deceptive opinion
spam of hotels.
sentiment (1- or 2-star) deceptive opinion spam reviews of the same 20 Chicago
hotels, which we use in Section 4.2 to test how the sentiment of a review affects
cues to deception, and the performance of Machine Learning classifiers. In Sec-
tion 2.3.3, we collect 200 gold standard positive deceptive opinion spam reviews
of 10 Chicago restaurants, which we use in Section 4.3 to test the influence of the
domain, or topic, of a deception on cues to deception, and the performance of
Machine Learning classifiers.
We chose to study this data for primarily two reasons: (a) hotel and restau-
rant reviews are abundant in most markets, and (b) hotels and restaurants are
evaluated on a relatively narrow number of aspects (unlike, for example, prod-
uct reviews), so that reviews can be easily compared across different hotels or
restaurants. Nevertheless, the methodology presented in this section for collect-
ing labeled deceptive data should apply equally to collecting deceptive opinion
spam in other domains, such as doctors, apartments, products, etc.
2.3.1 Positive Deceptive Opinion Spam of Hotels
Gold standard positive deceptive opinion spam is gathered from Mechan-
ical Turk using the same procedure that we introduced in Ott et al. [88].
In particular, we create and divide 400 Mechanical Turk jobs, called
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Human-Intelligence Tasks (HITs), evenly across 20 of the most popular hotels
in Chicago (defined by the number of reviews on TripAdvisor), such that we
obtain 20 reviews for each hotel. Popular hotels are chosen to minimize the
risk of including deceptive opinion spam when building a matching sample of
TRUTHFUL reviews (see Section 2.5.1). In particular, it has been hypothesized
that popular offerings are less likely to become targets of deceptive opinion
spam, since the relative impact of spam in such cases is small [48, 63].
The original prompt given to each worker is reproduced in Figure 2.1. Each
prompt was accompanied with the name of a hotel and a link to the hotel’s web-
site. Additionally, a set of disclaimers indicated that any submission found to be
of insufficient quality (e.g., written for the wrong hotel, unintelligible, unreason-
ably short, plagiarized,3 etc.) would be rejected. A submission was considered
unreasonably short if it contained fewer than 150 characters.
We allow workers to complete only a single HIT each, so that each review is
written by a unique worker; however, because Mechanical Turk does not pro-
vide a convenient mechanism for ensuring the uniqueness of workers, we intro-
duce a web service and associated script to implement this functionality, called
Unique Turker.4 We additionally restrict the task to workers who are located
in the United States, and who maintain an approval rating on Mechanical Turk
of at least 90%. Workers are allowed a maximum of 30 minutes to work on the
HIT, and are paid one US dollar for an accepted submission.
It took approximately 14 days to collect 400 satisfactory deceptive opinions.
Descriptive statistics appear in Table 2.1. Submissions vary quite dramatically
both in length and time spent on the task. Notably, nearly 12% of the submis-
sions were completed in under one minute. However, an independent two-tailed
3Submissions were individually checked for plagiarism at: http://plagiarisma.net.
4Unique Turker is available at: http://uniqueturker.myleott.com.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics for 400 positive deceptive opinion spam reviews
of 20 Chicago hotels, gathered through Mechanical Turk. The mean
hourly wage is given in terms of the harmonic mean.
Num. Sample
Reviews Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev.
Time spent (minutes) 400 0.08 29.78 8.06 6.32
Length (words)
All reviews 400 25 425 115.75 61.30
Time spent < 1 minute 47 39 407 113.94 66.24
Time spent ≥ 1 minute 353 25 425 115.99 60.71
Hourly wage ($) 400 2.01 720.00 7.45
t-test between the mean length of these submissions ( ¯`t<1) and the other submis-
sions ( ¯`t≥1) shows no significant difference (p = 0.83). Possibly, these “quick”
users started working prior to having formally accepted the HIT, in order to
circumvent the imposed time limit. Indeed, the quickest submission took just 5
seconds, yet contained 114 words.
This data is used in Chapter 3 to test the abilities of human judges and Ma-
chine Learning classifiers to detect deceptive opinion spam. This data is ad-
ditionally used in Chapter 4 to investigate the influence of several contextual
factors, such as the sentiment of a review, the domain of a review, and the do-
main expertise of the reviewer, on the ability of Machine Learning classifiers to
detect deceptive opinion spam. Finally, this data is used in Chapter 5 to train
Machine Learning classifiers to estimate the prevalence of deception in online
review communities.
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2.3.2 Negative Deceptive Opinion Spam of Hotels
Deceptive opinion spam can also be negative in sentiment; for example, a busi-
ness may post deceptive negative reviews of a competitor’s offerings to drive
additional business toward their own offerings. Negative deceptive opinion
spam is needed in Section 4.2, along with the positive-sentiment deceptive re-
views from Section 2.3.1, to determine the influence that the sentiment of a re-
view has on cues to deception, and to evaluate the effect of sentiment on training
Machine Learning classifiers to detect deceptive opinion spam.
Negative deceptive opinion spam is gathered for the same 20 Chicago hotels
and in the same manner as the positive data in Section 2.3.1, and as reported in
Ott et al. [87]. In the negative-sentiment setting, each HIT instructs the worker
to imagine that they work for the marketing department of a hotel, as before,
but now their boss asks them to write a fake negative review of a competitor’s ho-
tel. The other instructions and disclaimers remain identical to those used for
collecting the positive-sentiment data, with one additional exception. Namely,
submissions were manually inspected to ensure that they properly conveyed a
negative sentiment, and approximately 2% of the submissions were discarded
and replaced, where it was clear that the worker had misread the instructions
and had instead written a deceptive positive review.
Descriptive statistics for the negative-sentiment data are similar to those of
the positive-sentiment data, except that the average accepted review length was
178 words, compared to only 116 words in the positive-sentiment data. This
difference in lengths across sentiments is also observed in the TRUTHFUL data
where negative-sentiment reviews on TripAdvisor are on average 198 words,
compared to 141 words for positive-sentiment reviews.
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2.3.3 Positive Deceptive Opinion Spam of Restaurants
Section 4.3 investigates how the domain, or topic, of a deception influences cues
to deception, by training Machine Learning classifiers on reviews of one domain
(HOTELS), and evaluating their performance on reviews from another domain
(RESTAURANTS).
Positive deceptive opinion spam reviews of restaurants are obtained from
Mechanical Turk using the same procedure that was used in Section 2.3.1 to
collect positive deceptive opinion spam of hotels, except that each HIT now
instructs the worker to imagine that they are an employee at a restaurant, rather
than a hotel. We gather 20 positive deceptive reviews for each of 10 of the most
popular restaurants in Chicago, for a total of 200 positive deceptive restaurant
reviews. These DECEPTIVE restaurant reviews are then paired with matching
TRUTHFUL reviews in Section 2.5.2.
2.4 Deception by Domain Experts
Section 4.4 investigates how a reviewer’s domain knowledge, or expertise, in-
fluences the way that they produce deceptive opinion spam. Accordingly,
we need deceptive opinion spam written by people with expert-level domain
knowledge, or domain expert deceptive opinion spam. Unfortunately, it is not
appropriate to use crowdsourcing to obtain this data, because domain expertise
is difficult to verify in crowdsourcing marketplaces. Nevertheless, small quan-
tities of gold standard data can be obtained by identifying domain experts and
soliciting deceptive reviews from them directly.
We build a novel dataset of domain expert deceptive opinion spam by so-
liciting reviews from hotel employees, who have expert-level domain knowledge
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of the HOTELS domain, in general, and of their own hotels, specifically. In par-
ticular, we ask two hotel employees from each of seven hotels (14 employees
total) to each write 10 deceptive positive-sentiment reviews of their own hotel,
and 10 deceptive negative-sentiment reviews of their biggest local competitor’s
hotel. The instructions given to each hotel employee are similar to those given
to Mechanical Turk workers in Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2. Hotel employee are each
paid $50 for their participation. In total, we obtain 280 deceptive reviews of 14
hotels, including a balanced mix of positive- and negative-sentiment reviews.
Then, in order to fully study the effect of domain expertise on deception, we
crowdsource an equal number of reviews for the same 14 hotels using Mechan-
ical Turk, using the procedures presented in Section 2.3.1 (positive reviews) and
Section 2.3.2 (negative reviews). Finally, corresponding TRUTHFUL reviews for
these 14 hotels are obtained from TripAdvisor (see Section 2.5.1).
2.5 Truthful Reviews
In order to train supervised Machine Learning classifiers in Chapter 3, and
throughout the rest of this dissertation, it is necessary to pair the DECEPTIVE re-
views gathered in Sections 2.3 and 2.4 with matching TRUTHFUL reviews writ-
ten by real customers. Unfortunately, while publicly available review data is
ubiquitous on the Web, for the same reasons that we cannot manually annotate
real-world reviews as DECEPTIVE, we also cannot manually annotate real-world
reviews as TRUTHFUL.
Fortunately, recent findings, including our own findings in Chapter 5, sug-
gest that rates of deception among travel review websites are low [67]. More-
over, we have primarily considered reviews of highly-popular5 offerings, which
5Popularity is defined as the number of reviews that an offering has on TripAdvisor.
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are hypothesized to contain less deceptive opinion spam, since the relative im-
pact of spam for such offerings is small [48, 63]. We therefore gather publicly
available reviews from six popular review websites, and sample from them a
subset of reviews, which we label as TRUTHFUL.
We describe our TRUTHFUL hotel review data in Section 2.5.1 and our
TRUTHFUL restaurant review data in Section 2.5.2.
2.5.1 Truthful Hotel Reviews
Hotel review data is obtained from six popular online hotel review communi-
ties: Expedia, Hotels.com, Orbitz, Priceline, TripAdvisor, and Yelp. The pri-
mary data source used in this work is TripAdvisor, which is the largest review
community in the HOTELS domain, by number of reviews. Reviews from the
other five communities are also used, for example, to obtain sufficient numbers
of negative reviews for the analysis in Section 4.2, and to test hypotheses in
Chapter 5 about rates of deception in different review communities.
TripAdvisor
We mine all 64,531 reviews appearing on TripAdvisor in December 2012 from
all 165 hotels in the Chicago area. This collection contains reviews for all 20
Chicago hotels for which we crowdsourced deceptive opinion spam in Sec-
tions 2.3.1 and 2.3.2. Except where specified otherwise, we filter this data by
eliminating (in order):
• 4,183 non-English reviews;6
6We use the ldig social media language identification library, available here: https://
github.com/shuyo/ldig.
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• 1,800 reviews with fewer than 150 characters, since all crowdsourced
DECEPTIVE reviews are at least 150 characters long (see Section 2.3);
• 12,315 singleton reviews—reviews written by new users who have not pre-
viously posted a review on TripAdvisor—since these reviews are hypothe-
sized to be more likely to contain opinion spam [132], which would reduce
the integrity of our truthful review data.
We then mine an additional 4,694 TripAdvisor reviews for the 14 hotels re-
viewed by hotel employees (domain experts) in Section 2.4.
For each of the deceptive opinion spam datasets collected in Sections 2.3
and 2.4, we sample an equal number of reviews from this TripAdvisor data,
controlling for hotel and sentiment, and label them as TRUTHFUL. In order for
the lengths of these TRUTHFUL reviews to be similarly distributed to those of
the DECEPTIVE reviews, we sample reviews from TripAdvisor randomly, but
with probabilities coming from a log-normal distribution7 (left-truncated at 150
characters), fit to the lengths of each set of DECEPTIVE reviews.8
Finally, we note that there are two exceptions to this sampling process, both
resulting from a shortage of negative-sentiment TripAdvisor reviews of our cho-
sen hotels. First, when sampling TRUTHFUL data to match the negative decep-
tive opinion spam data from Section 2.3.2, we rely on a combination of the
TripAdvisor data presented here and the Six Chicago Review Communities data
presented below. Second, one of the hotels reviewed by hotel employees in Sec-
tion 2.4 only has 14 negative reviews in our TripAdvisor dataset, compared to
20 negative DECEPTIVE reviews for the same hotel. Unfortunately, because we
do not have access to substitute data for this hotel, we instead leave the final
7Work by Serrano et al. [115] suggests that a log-normal distribution is appropriate for mod-
eling document lengths.
8We use the R package GAMLSS [108] to fit the left-truncated log-normal distribution.
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Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics for positive-sentiment (5-star) Chicago hotel re-
view data from six online review communities, through to August 2011.
Num. Num.
Community Hotels Reviews
Expedia 100 4,341
Hotels.com 103 6,792
Orbitz 97 1,777
Priceline 98 4,027
TripAdvisor 104 9,602
Yelp 103 1,537
dataset slightly unbalanced.
Six Chicago Review Communities
Chapter 5 investigates how community-specific factors influence the preva-
lence, or rate, of deception in a review community, and therefore requires re-
view data from multiple review communities. Accordingly, and as reported in
Ott et al. [86], we obtain all Chicago hotel reviews (through to August 2011) from
six popular online hotel review communities: Expedia, Hotels.com, Orbitz,
Priceline, TripAdvisor, and Yelp. Corpus statistics are given in Table 2.2.
Note that due to a bug in our data, Priceline reviews are truncated to a max-
imum length of 370 characters. While we ignore this artifact in the remainder
of this work, the effect that this truncation may have on the corresponding re-
sults is unclear. As such, we are unable to draw strong conclusions about the
Priceline review community from our data.
2.5.2 Truthful Restaurant Reviews
In Section 2.3.3, we crowdsourced positive DECEPTIVE reviews for 10 popular
Chicago restaurants. Here, we mine matching positive TRUTHFUL restaurant
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<URL>: Web links or other URLs.
<EMAIL>: E-mail addresses.
<TIME>: Numeric time of day, e.g., 10:30 or 23:00.
<MONEY>: Money, e.g., $150 or $12.50.
<NUMBER>: Integer or decimal numbers.
<EMOTICON>: Standard “emotion icon” character sequences, e.g., :) or :(.
<DASH>: One or more consecutive hyphen-dash (-) characters.
<HASHTAG>: A token that begins with a # character.
<ATMENTION>: A token that begins with a @ character.
<ELLIPSIS>: Two or more consecutive periods.
<INTERROBANG>: Any number of consecutive exclamation points and question
marks, but at least one of each.
<EXCLAMATION>: One or more consecutive exclamation points.
<QUESTION>: One or more consecutive question marks.
Figure 2.2: Special classes of tokens that are collapsed in preprocessing, and the
special tokens with which they are replaced.
reviews from TripAdvisor using the same procedure used in Section 2.5.1. In
particular, we mine all TripAdvisor reviews in December 2012 for the same 10
popular Chicago restaurants. After filtering reviews with fewer than 150 char-
acters, non-English reviews, and singleton reviews, we are left with 3,727 re-
views. From these, as before, we sample 200 reviews to label as TRUTHFUL,
where reviews are sampled with probabilities based on their lengths, relative to
a log-normal distribution fit to the lengths of the DECEPTIVE reviews.
2.6 Data Preprocessing
We additionally apply several preprocessing steps to all of the data that we col-
lect in this chapter. First, we convert all reviews to ASCII, to eliminate any
unusual or non-standard characters that would increase the dimentionality of
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the data or cause problems in down-stream processing tasks, using a combi-
nation of BeautifulSoup9 and Unidecode.10 Next, we tokenize each review with
the Twokenize social media text tokenizer,11 which properly handles most URLs
and emoticons. Finally, we collapse instances of several classes of tokens into
special placeholder tokens, given in Figure 2.2.
2.7 Chapter Summary
We have discussed several approaches for creating and labeling deceptive con-
tent, including traditional, non-gold standard, and crowdsourced approaches.
We have argued that, in the context of deceptive opinion spam, crowdsourc-
ing approaches offer a number of benefits over traditional and non-gold stan-
dard approaches, including gold standard labeling, mirroring of real-world de-
ception, and a worker population that better resembles the general population,
compared to university students.
We have demonstrated how crowdsourcing services, such as Mechanical
Turk, can be used to solicit gold standard deceptive opinion spam both quickly
and cheaply. In particular, we have developed the first large-scale dataset of
gold standard deceptive opinion spam, containing 1,280 deceptive reviews of
hotels and restaurants, including a mix of positive (4- or 5-star) and negative (1- or
2-star) deceptive opinion spam, as well as domain expert deceptive opinion spam
written by hotel employees. Finally, we have paired each set of DECEPTIVE re-
views with matching TRUTHFUL reviews, and have made the resulting corpus
publicly available.12
9http://www.crummy.com/software/BeautifulSoup/
10http://pypi.python.org/pypi/Unidecode
11Twokenize is available from: http://www.ark.cs.cmu.edu/TweetNLP.
12The data used in this dissertation is available from: http://www.cs.cornell.edu/
˜myleott/op_spam.
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CHAPTER 3
A MACHINE LEARNING APPROACH TO DETECTING DECEPTIVE
OPINION SPAM
3.1 Introduction
We argue in Chapter 1 that deceptive opinion spam, even in small quantities,
can be both highly influential and highly damaging, for example, if the spam
targets a business whose average review rating is on a rating boundary [2, 65].
Unfortunately, the massive volume of online reviews makes manual inspection
and moderation of reviews impractical. Moreover, as we show in Section 3.3,
people are largely unable to identify deceptive reviews. Accordingly, there is
growing interest in developing automated approaches for identifying and filter-
ing deceptive opinion spam.
In this chapter, we propose an approach for automatically identifying de-
ceptive opinion spam, by training Machine Learning classifiers to distinguish
between DECEPTIVE and TRUTHFUL reviews. More generally, using the gold
standard data that we introduced in Chapter 2, we explore the problem of de-
tecting deceptive opinion spam through three questions:
1. Human Performance: How effective are human judges at detecting de-
ceptive opinion spam?
2. Machine Learning Performance: Can Machine Learning classifiers be
trained to automatically detect deceptive opinion spam?
3. Linguistic Cues: What are the linguistic cues to deceptive opinion spam,
and how do they relate to linguistic cues to other kinds of deception?
To answer the first question, and to verify the convincingness of our gold
standard deceptive reviews, we ask three undergraduate students to read and
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judge a subset of our data, and evaluate their ability to distinguish between
DECEPTIVE and TRUTHFUL reviews (see Section 3.3). We find that human judge-
ments: (a) are truth biased, in that they are more likely to predict TRUTHFUL than
DECEPTIVE; and (b) rarely predict deception better than chance, consistent with
decades of traditional deception research in psychology [9].
Next, we consider whether Machine Learning classifiers can be trained to au-
tomatically detect deceptive opinion spam. While we are not the first to apply
Machine Learning techniques to this task (see related work in Section 3.2), our
approach is the first that uses gold standard deceptive data. In particular, using
the gold standard data described in Chapter 2, we train and evaluate two pop-
ular kinds of supervised Machine Learning classifiers—Support Vector Machine
(SVM) and Naı¨ve Bayes (see Section 3.4)—and compare their performance when
trained on three potentially complementary sets of features (see Section 3.5). We
find, in general, that Machine Learning classifiers significantly outperform hu-
man judgements on this task, with the best models approaching 90% accuracy
in our balanced dataset.
Finally, we make several theoretical contributions by inspecting the trained
Machine Learning models. In particular, we examine the largest predictors of
deceptive opinion spam in each model, and compare these to linguistic cues to
other kinds of deception (see Section 3.6.3). In general, our findings confirm
the existence of linguistic cues to deceptive opinion spam, but also highlight
the importance of considering the context underlying a deception, which we
address further in Chapter 4.
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3.2 Related Work
Spam has been studied in a variety of settings, for example, e-mail [24, 119],
blogs [74], and the Web [14, 38, 82]. In these settings, human spam detection
performance is relatively good [14], and it is possible to obtain large quanti-
ties of gold standard labeled data through manual annotation. Accordingly,
research into these kinds of spam have had success using supervised Machine
Learning techniques, which benefit from large quantities of labeled data, and
which perform well in practice [119].
In contrast, researchers have only recently begun to study deceptive opinion
spam, because, in part, of the challenges associated with obtaining labeled data
(see the discussion in Chapter 2). For example, in the absence of gold standard
deceptive reviews, Jindal and Liu [48] train Machine Learning classifiers using
features based on the review text, reviewer, and product, to distinguish between
duplicate reviews1 (considered to be DECEPTIVE) and non-duplicate opinions (con-
sidered to be TRUTHFUL). Similarly, in the absence of gold standard data, Wu et
al. [132] propose a strategy for detecting deceptive opinion spam based on dis-
tortions of popularity rankings. Heuristic and unlabeled approaches are unnec-
essary in our work, however, since we rely on gold standard DECEPTIVE reviews
obtained through crowdsourcing (see Section 2.3).
Notably, Yoo and Gretzel [134] use a sanctioned lie approach (see Sec-
tion 2.2.1) to obtain 42 gold standard deceptive opinion spam reviews, by asking
tourism marketing students to each write one deceptive, positive-sentiment re-
view of the HOUSTON AIRPORT MARRIOTT hotel. They pair these reviews with
1Duplicate (or near-duplicate) reviews are reviews that appear more than once in the corpus
with the same (or similar) text. While these reviews may be deceptive, it is also possible for a
review to be duplicated accidentally, and just because a review has been duplicated does not
mean that the original review was deceptive. Moreover, such reviews are potentially detectable
via off-the-shelf plagiarism detection software [10, 99].
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40 reviews from TripAdvisor, and use a standard statistical test to manually
compare the psychologically-relevant linguistic differences between them. In
contrast, we create a much larger dataset (see Chapter 2) that we use to develop
and evaluate Machine Learning deception classifiers.
Research has also been conducted on the related task of psycholinguistic de-
ception detection. Mihalcea and Strapparava [73] train Machine Learning clas-
sifiers to distinguish between true and untrue views on personal issues (e.g.,
their stance on the death penalty). Zhou et al. [136, 137] train Machine Learn-
ing classifiers to detect deception in role-playing games designed to be played
over instant messaging and e-mail. However, these studies do not consider the
detection of deceptive opinion spam. Moreover, while this previous work only
evaluates Machine Learning classifiers trained on a single set of features, typi-
cally n-grams, and only compares Machine Learning classifiers to one another,
we evaluate and compare three sets of features (described in Section 3.5), as well
as the performance of human judges (described in Section 3.3).
Lastly, automatic approaches to determining review quality have been
studied—directly [129], and in the contexts of review helpfulness [22, 55, 84]
and review credibility [128]. Unfortunately, the measures of quality employed
in those works are based on human judgments, which we find in Section 3.3 to
be poorly calibrated to detecting deceptive opinion spam.
3.3 Human Ability to Detect Deceptive Opinion Spam
In this section, we investigate whether human judges are capable of detecting
deceptive opinion spam. Answering this question is important for several rea-
sons. First, there are few other baselines for our classification task; indeed, re-
lated studies [48, 73] have only considered a random guess baseline. Second,
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assessing human performance is necessary to validate the deceptive opinions
gathered in Section 2.3. For example, if human deception detection performance
is very high, then it would cast doubt on the usefulness of the crowdsourcing
approach for soliciting gold standard deceptive opinion spam.
3.3.1 Experimental Setup
Our initial approach to assessing human performance on this task was with
Mechanical Turk. Unfortunately, we found that some Mechanical Turk workers
would select among the choices seemingly at random, presumably to maximize
their hourly earnings. While a similar effect has been observed previously [1],
there remains no universal solution.
Instead, we solicit the help of three volunteer undergraduate university stu-
dents to make judgments on a subset of our data. This balanced subset, cor-
responding to the first fold of our cross-validation experiments (described in
Section 3.6.1), contains 20 DECEPTIVE and 20 TRUTHFUL positive-sentiment re-
views from each of four Chicago hotels (160 reviews total). Unlike the Mechan-
ical Turk workers, our student volunteers are not offered a monetary reward.
Consequently, we consider their judgements to be more honest than those ob-
tained via Mechanical Turk.
We evaluate the performance of the human judges both individually and
collectively. Specifically, we report each judge’s accuracy, and TRUTHFUL and
DECEPTIVE (P)recision, (R)ecall and (F)1-score.2 Additionally, to test the extent
to which the individual human judges are biased, we consider two meta-judges:
(a) a MAJORITY meta-judge, that predicts DECEPTIVE whenever at least two out
of three human judges believe the review to be deceptive; and (b) a SKEPTIC
2F1-score is the harmonic mean of precision and recall.
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Table 3.1: Deception detection performance of three human judges and two meta-
judges on 160 reviews, corresponding to the first fold of our cross-
validation experiments in Section 3.6.1. Boldface denotes the largest
value in each column.
TRUTHFUL DECEPTIVE
Accuracy P R F P R F
JUDGE 1 61.9 57.9 87.5 69.7 74.4 36.3 48.7
JUDGE 2 56.9 53.9 95.0 68.8 78.9 18.8 30.3
JUDGE 3 53.1 52.3 70.0 59.9 54.7 36.3 43.6
MAJORITY 58.1 54.8 92.5 68.8 76.0 23.8 36.2
SKEPTIC 60.6 60.8 60.0 60.4 60.5 61.3 60.9
meta-judge, that predicts DECEPTIVE whenever any human judge believes the
review to be deceptive.
3.3.2 Results and Discussion
Human and meta-judge performance is given in Table 3.1. It is clear from the re-
sults that human judges are not particularly effective at this task. Indeed, a two-
tailed binomial test fails to reject the null hypothesis that JUDGE 2 and JUDGE 3
perform at-chance (p = 0.003, 0.10, 0.48 for the three judges, respectively). Inter-
annotator agreement scores are similarly low for the three judges. For example,
Fleiss’ kappa computed among the three judges is 0.11, corresponding to only
slight agreement between annotators [59]. Furthermore, the largest pairwise Co-
hen’s kappa is 0.12, between JUDGE 2 and JUDGE 3—a value far below generally
accepted pairwise agreement levels. We suspect that agreement among our hu-
man judges is so low precisely because humans are poor judges of deception, and
therefore perform nearly at-chance relative to one another.
The finding that humans are poor judges of deception is also well supported
in the deception literature in psychology. For example, untrained humans often
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focus on unreliable cues to deception [124], such as increased usage of second-
person pronouns [121]. Moreover, a recent meta-analysis of 206 studies found
that humans rarely predict deception better than chance [9].
Truth Bias We also observe that all three human judges suffer from a truth bias,
a common finding in deception detection research in which people are more
likely to classify something as truthful than deceptive [9, 124]. For example,
one of the human judges (JUDGE 2) classified fewer than 12% of the reviews
as DECEPTIVE. We note that this bias is effectively smoothed by the SKEPTIC
meta-judge, which produces nearly perfectly class-balanced predictions.
One possible explanation of the observed truth bias is that our human judges
were not told the class-balance, i.e., they did not know that the dataset contained
50% DECEPTIVE and 50% TRUTHFUL reviews. While this constraint is realistic,
to see the impact that such knowledge would have on this task, we re-evaluated
human performance on this same data with three new undergraduate students,
who this time were made aware of the class-balance in advance. We found
that detection performance remained similar to that given in Table 3.1, with
accuracies for the three distribution-aware human judges of 53.1%, 57.5% and
66.9%. However, this second batch of human judgments were far less truth-
biased, with the three judges annotating between 33% and 52% of reviews as
DECEPTIVE, compared to between 12% and 33% among the original judges.
3.4 Machine Learning Classifiers
Following previous work [73, 137], we train and compare two kinds of Machine
Learning classifiers on our deception detection task: Naı¨ve Bayes (Section 3.4.1)
and Support Vector Machine (Section 3.4.2). We train these classifiers in a su-
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pervised manner, in which each classifier is given a set of labeled training data,
containing pairs of reviews and their associated labels. We represent each re-
view as a feature vector, ~xi ∈ R|V |, where |V | corresponds to the size of the feature
space, and each label as a binary indicator, yi ∈ {−1, 1}, where −1 corresponds to
TRUTHFUL and 1 corresponds to DECEPTIVE. This section gives an overview of
each kind of classifier, with an emphasis on how they make predictions.
3.4.1 Naı¨ve Bayes
Naı¨ve Bayes classifiers rely on Bayes’ rule to make classification decisions. In our
setting, this means that for each unseen test review, ~x, the Naı¨ve Bayes classifier
will predict a label, yˆ ∈ {DECEPTIVE, TRUTHFUL}, according to the following
decision rule:
yˆ = argmax
c
Pθ(y = c | ~x)
∝ argmax
c
Pθ(y = c) · Pθ(~x | y = c), (3.1)
where parameters, θ, are estimated from the training data. Specifically, Pθ(y = c)
corresponds to the class prior, or the probability of seeing class c in the training
data, and Pθ(~x | y = c) corresponds to the likelihood, or the probability of seeing
the review, ~x, conditioned on the class of the review being c. Furthermore, when
the class prior is uniform, for example, when the classes are balanced (as in our
case), we can simplify (3.1) to the maximum likelihood classifier [94]:
yˆ = argmax
c
Pθ(~x | y = c) (3.2)
Under (3.2), both the Naı¨ve Bayes classifier used by Mihalcea and Strappar-
ava [73] and the language model classifier used by Zhou et al. [137] are equiv-
alent. In particular, for the n-gram features described below (see Section 3.5.3),
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we can estimate individual language models, Pθ(~x | y = c), for the DECEPTIVE and
TRUTHFUL training data, and compare the scores from those models directly
to make predictions. Following Zhou et al. [137], we estimate language mod-
ules with the SRI Language Modeling Toolkit [118]. We additionally smooth the
models using the interpolated Kneser-Ney method [16], which has been shown
to closely approximate hierarchical Pitman-Yor language models [120].
3.4.2 Support Vector Machine
Support Vector Machine (SVM) classifiers find a high-dimensional separating hy-
perplane between two groups of data, and have been found to perform well on
textual data [49, 73, 137]. To simplify our feature analysis in Section 3.6.3, we
restrict our evaluation to linear SVMs, which learn a weight vector ~w and bias
term b, such that an unseen test review, ~x, can be classified by the decision rule:
yˆ = sign(~w · ~x + b) (3.3)
We use SVMlight [50] to train our linear SVM classifiers, and tune the parame-
ter, C, through cross-validation (see Section 3.6.1). Following standard practice,
we additionally normalize feature vectors to unit-length.
3.5 Approaches and Features
To obtain a deeper understanding of the nature of deceptive opinion spam, we
explore the relative utility of three potentially complementary framings of this
task. Each framing corresponds to a set of features, which we use to train the
Machine Learning classifiers in Section 3.4. Specifically, we view this task as:
1. A genre identification task, in which DECEPTIVE and TRUTHFUL reviews
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are sub-genres of imaginative (fiction) and informative (non-fiction) writ-
ing, respectively [5, 105]; these classifiers are trained on syntactic features.
2. A psycholinguistic deception detection task, in which deceptive state-
ments exemplify the psychological effects of lying, such as increased neg-
ative emotion and psychological distancing [39, 78]; these classifiers are
trained on dictionary-based features.
3. A standard text categorization task, in which DECEPTIVE and TRUTHFUL
reviews represent distinct document categories [49, 114]; these classifiers
are trained on content features.
The rest of this section discusses the details of each of these three feature sets.
3.5.1 Genre Identification
Work in computational linguistics has shown that the frequency distribution of
parts-of-speech (POS) in a text are often dependent on the genre of the text [5,
105]. In our genre identification approach to detecting deceptive opinion spam,
we test if such a relationship exists for DECEPTIVE and TRUTHFUL reviews by
constructing features containing the frequencies of each POS, obtained using
the Stanford Parser [56]. Our expectation is that DECEPTIVE reviews will better
resemble fiction, or imaginative writing, while TRUTHFUL reviews will better
resemble non-fiction, or informative writing. These features are also intended
to provide a good baseline with which to compare our other approaches.
3.5.2 Psycholinguistic Deception Detection
In our psycholinguistic deception detection approach, we expect DECEPTIVE re-
views to exemplify the psychological effects of lying, such as increased neg-
44
ative emotion and psychological distancing [39, 78]. In particular, we create
psychologically-relevant features using the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count
(LIWC) software [96]—an automated text analysis tool, popular in the social
sciences, that has been used to detect personality traits [66], study tutoring dy-
namics [13], and analyze deception [39, 73, 126].
LIWC counts and groups the number of instances of nearly 4,500 keywords
into 80 psychologically meaningful dimensions. We construct one feature for
each of the 80 LIWC dimensions, which can be summarized broadly under the
following four categories:3
1. Linguistic processes: Functional aspects of text, for example, the average
number of words per sentence, the rate of misspellings, swear words, etc.
2. Psychological processes: Includes all social, emotional, cognitive, percep-
tual and biological processes, as well as anything related to time or space.
3. Personal concerns: Any references to work, leisure, money, religion, etc.
4. Spoken categories: Primarily filler and agreement words.
While other psycholinguistic feature categories have been considered in past
deception detection work, notably those of Zhou et al. [136], early experiments
found the LIWC features to perform best. Indeed, the LIWC2007 software used
in this work subsumes most of the categories used in this previous work.
3.5.3 Text Categorization
In contrast to the other two approaches just discussed, our text categorization ap-
proach to detecting deception allows us to model both the content and shallow
context of each review through n-gram features. Specifically, an n-gram feature
3More details about LIWC and the LIWC categories are available at: http://liwc.net.
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representation of a review containing W words will produce (W −n+1) features,
corresponding to sequential word-level windows of size n. For example, we
might represent the text “my wife and I” with four 1-grams, or unigrams (my
| wife | and | i); three 2-grams, or bigrams (my wife | wife and | and i); or
two 3-grams, or trigrams (my wife and | wife and i).
We consider three n-gram feature sets, with the corresponding features low-
ercased and unstemmed: UNIGRAMS (1-grams), BIGRAMS+ (1- and 2-grams) and
TRIGRAMS+ (1-, 2- and 3-grams), where the superscript (+) is used to indicate
that higher-order n-gram feature sets subsume the lower-order ones.
3.6 Evaluation
3.6.1 Experimental Setup
We evaluate the classifiers and features described in Sections 3.4 and 3.5, re-
spectively, using a 5-fold nested cross-validation (CV) procedure [123], where
model parameters are selected for each test fold based on nested CV experi-
ments on the training folds. Each of the five folds contains 20 DECEPTIVE (see
Section 2.3.1) and 20 TRUTHFUL (see Section 2.5.1) positive-sentiment reviews of
four Chicago hotels (800 reviews total). Because folds contain reviews of distinct
hotels, learned models are always evaluated on reviews from unseen hotels. We
explore classification of negative-sentiment hotel reviews in Chapter 4.
For each combination of classifier and features, we report the (P)recision,
(R)ecall and (F)1-score, which we compute using a micro-average, i.e., from the
aggregate true positive, false positive and false negative rates, as suggested by
Forman and Scholz [34]. Note that we only report performance for Naı¨ve Bayes
classifiers (Section 3.4.1) using the text categorization feature set (Section 3.5.3).
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While we tried other combinations of features with Naı¨ve Bayes classifiers, they
consistently underperformed the corresponding Support Vector Machine clas-
sifiers, and the results are therefore excluded for brevity. The superior perfor-
mance of Support Vector Machine over Naı¨ve Bayes classifiers on this task is
discussed further in Section 3.6.2.
3.6.2 Results and Discussion
Comparison to Human Performance Results appear in Table 3.2. We observe
that automated classifiers outperform human judges for every metric, except
truthful recall, where JUDGE 2 performs best. However, as we mention in Sec-
tion 3.3, JUDGE 2 classified fewer than 12% of opinions as deceptive. Thus, while
achieving 95% truthful recall, this judge’s corresponding precision was not sig-
nificantly different from chance (two-tailed binomial p = 0.4).
Genre Identification Approach Among the automated classifiers, baseline
performance is given by the simple genre identification approach (POSSVM), pro-
posed in Section 3.5.1. We find that even this simple automated classifier outper-
forms most human judges (one-tailed sign test p = 0.06, 0.01, 0.001 for the three
judges, respectively, on the first fold). This result is best explained by theories
of reality monitoring [51], which suggest that truthful and deceptive opinions
might be classified into informative and imaginative genres, respectively. We
explore this relationship further in Section 3.6.3.
Psycholinguistic and Text Categorization Approaches Both remaining auto-
mated approaches to detecting deceptive opinion spam outperform the simple
genre identification baseline just discussed. Specifically, the psycholinguistic
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Table 3.2: Machine Learning classifier performance for three approaches
based on nested 5-fold cross-validation experiments and 800
positive-sentiment Chicago reviews. Specific classifiers are in-
dicated via subscripts. Human performance is repeated here
for JUDGE 1, JUDGE 2 and the SKEPTIC meta-judge, although
they cannot be compared directly, since the 160-review subset
on which human performance was assessed corresponds to only
a single cross-validation fold (see Section 3.3).
TRUTHFUL DECEPTIVE
Approach Features Accuracy P R F P R F
Genre identification POSSVM 73.0 75.3 68.5 71.7 71.1 77.5 74.2
Psycholinguistic LIWCSVM 76.8 77.2 76.0 76.6 76.4 77.5 76.9
deception detection
Text categorization UNIGRAMSSVM 88.4 89.9 86.5 88.2 87.0 90.3 88.6
BIGRAMS+SVM 89.6 90.1 89.0 89.6 89.1 90.3 89.7
LIWC+BIGRAMS+SVM 89.8 89.8 89.8 89.8 89.8 89.8 89.8
TRIGRAMS+SVM 89.0 89.0 89.0 89.0 89.0 89.0 89.0
UNIGRAMSNB 88.4 92.5 83.5 87.8 85.0 93.3 88.9
BIGRAMS+NB 88.9 89.8 87.8 88.7 88.0 90.0 89.0
TRIGRAMS+NB 87.6 87.7 87.5 87.6 87.5 87.8 87.6
Human JUDGE 1 61.9 57.9 87.5 69.7 74.4 36.3 48.7
JUDGE 2 56.9 53.9 95.0 68.8 78.9 18.8 30.3
SKEPTIC 60.6 60.8 60.0 60.4 60.5 61.3 60.9
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deception detection approach (LIWCSVM), proposed in Section 3.5.2, performs
3.8% more accurately (one-tailed sign test p = 0.02), and the text categoriza-
tion approach, proposed in Section 3.5.3, performs between 14.6% and 16.6%
more accurately. However, best performance overall is achieved by combin-
ing features from these two approaches. Particularly, the combined model
LIWC+BIGRAMS+SVM is 89.8% accurate at detecting deceptive opinion spam, al-
though the result is not significantly better than BIGRAMS+SVM alone.
We further observe that models trained on UNIGRAMS—the simplest n-gram
feature set—outperform all non–text-categorization approaches, and models
trained on BIGRAMS+ perform even better (one-tailed sign test p = 0.07). This
suggests that a universal set of keyword-based deception cues (e.g., LIWC) is not
the best approach for detecting deceptive opinion spam, and a more detailed set
of features (e.g., content n-grams) might be necessary to achieve state-of-the-art
deception detection performance. We explore this further in Section 3.6.3.
Machine Learning Classifiers Finally, and in contrast to related deception de-
tection work [73, 137], we observe that SVM classifiers nearly always outper-
form NB classifiers at this task, although not significantly (p = 0.50, 0.28, 0.23
for UNIGRAMS, BIGRAMS+, and TRIGRAMS+, respectively). Previous work by Ng
and Jordan [79] has found that generative approaches, such as NB, only out-
perform discriminative approaches, such as SVM, when the training set size is
small. Therefore, our findings may be explained by our large training set size,
relative to previous work.
We note that we also evaluated the performance of Logistic Regression (LR)
classifiers on this task, which are related to SVM classifiers, and are popular in
related work [48, 77, 78, 136]. However, we observed that SVM classifiers nearly
always outperform LR classifiers on our binary classification task, and we have
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therefore reported only SVM performance. We note further that LR classifiers
are often preferred when output probabilities are desired, rather than just binary
classification decisions. While LR classifiers more readily produce these kinds of
probabilities, it is also possible to obtain probabilities by calibrating the output
of SVM classifiers [81].
3.6.3 Linguistic Cues to Deceptive Opinion Spam
Machine Learning classifiers significantly outperform human performance on
this task. To better understand what these classifiers have learned, and any
corresponding linguistic cues to deception, we can examine the weight vector,
~w, learned by the linear SVM classifiers.
Informative and Imaginative Genres Work by Rayson et al. [105] has found
strong distributional differences between informative and imaginative writing,
namely that the former typically consists of more nouns, adjectives, preposi-
tions, determiners, and coordinating conjunctions, while the latter consists of
more verbs,4 adverbs,5 pronouns, and pre-determiners. Indeed, we find that the
weights learned by POSSVM (found in Table 3.4) are largely in agreement with
these findings, notably except for adjective and adverb superlatives, the latter
of which was also found to be an exception by Rayson et al. [105]. However,
that deceptive opinions contain more superlatives is expected, since deceptive
writing (but not necessarily imaginative writing, in general) often contains ex-
aggerated language [11, 39]. In fact, as we will show in Section 4.2.3, DECEPTIVE
reviews tend to exaggerate the underlying review sentiment, both in the case of
positive-sentiment and negative-sentiment reviews.
4Past participle verbs were an exception.
5Superlative adverbs were an exception.
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Table 3.3: Top 15 highest weighted TRUTHFUL and DECEPTIVE features learned by
LIWC+BIGRAMS+SVM and LIWCSVM. Ambiguous features are subscripted
to indicate the source of the feature. LIWC features correspond to
groups of keywords as explained in Section 3.5.2.
LIWC+BIGRAMS+SVM LIWCSVM
TRUTHFUL DECEPTIVE TRUTHFUL DECEPTIVE
<dash> chicago hear i
<ellipsis> my number family
on hotel allpunct ppron
location , and negemo see
) luxury dash pronoun
allpunctLIWC experience exclusive leisure
floor hilton we exclampunct
( business sexual sixletters
the hotel vacation period posemo
bathroom iBIGRAMS+ otherpunct comma
small spa space cause
helpful looking human auxverb
<money> while past future
hotel . husband inhibition perceptual
other my husband assent feel
51
Table 3.4: Average feature weights learned by POSSVM. Based on work by
Rayson et al. [105], we expect weights on the left to be negative
(predictive of TRUTHFUL reviews), and weights on the right to
be positive (predictive of DECEPTIVE reviews). Boldface entries
are at odds with these expectations.
Informative (TRUTHFUL) Imaginative (DECEPTIVE)
Category Type Weight Category Type Weight
Nouns singular −0.008 Verbs base 0.057
plural −0.002 past tense −0.041
proper, singular 0.041 present participle 0.089
proper, plural −0.091 singular, present 0.031
Adjectives general −0.002 third person −0.026
comparative −0.058 singular, present
superlative 0.164 modal 0.063
Prepositions general −0.064 Adverbs general −0.001
Determiners general −0.009 comparative 0.035
Coord. conj. general −0.094 Pronouns personal 0.098
Verbs past participle −0.053 possessive 0.303
Adverbs superlative 0.094 Pre-determiners general −0.017
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Spatial Details Table 3.3 gives the top 15 highest weighted features learned
by LIWC+BIGRAMS+SVM and LIWCSVM for each class (DECEPTIVE and TRUTHFUL).
We observe that TRUTHFUL reviews, compared to DECEPTIVE reviews, tend to
include more sensorial and concrete language, and include more specific spa-
tial details (e.g., small, bathroom, on, floor, location). These findings
are in agreement with theories of reality monitoring [51], and recent work by
Vrij et al. [125], which suggests that liars have considerable difficultly encoding
spatial information into their lies. In contrast, we find that DECEPTIVE reviews
generally focus on general features of the hotel (e.g., luxury, spa), or aspects
external to the hotel (e.g., husband, business, vacation), possibly because
the authors were crowdsourced from Mechanical Turk, and had no prior expe-
rience with the hotels they were reviewing.
Sentiment We also acknowledge several findings that, on the surface, are in
contrast to previous studies of deception. For instance, while deception is often
associated with increased negative emotion terms [39, 78], our LIWCSVM classifier
found positive emotion terms (posemoLIWC) to be predictive of DECEPTIVE re-
views, and negative emotion terms (negemoLIWC) to be predictive of TRUTHFUL
reviews. This result can be explained, however, as our deceivers exaggerating
the underlying positive sentiment of their reviews. We explore the relationship
between sentiment and cues to deception further in Section 4.2.
First-Person Singular Pronouns Deception has also previously been asso-
ciated with decreased usage of first-person singular pronouns, an effect at-
tributed to psychological distancing, whereby deceivers talk less about themselves
due either to a lack of personal experience, or to detach themselves from the
lie [78, 136]. In contrast, we find increased first person singular (iLIWC) to be
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among the largest indicators of deception. We suspect that this relates to an ef-
fect observed in previous studies of deception, where liars inadvertently under-
mine their lies by overemphasizing those aspects of their deception that they
believe reflect credibility [9, 23]. Accordingly, because our deceivers were in-
structed to produce a realistic deceptive review from the perspective of a cus-
tomer, they may have overemphasized their own presence, because they be-
lieved that doing so was necessary for their review to be perceived as credible.
Context Finally, we found in Section 3.6.2 that classifiers trained on n-gram
features significantly outperformed classifiers trained on more abstract features,
such as LIWC or parts-of-speech. Indeed, we observe that many of the top n-
gram features for the DECEPTIVE class are highly specific to the context of the
training data (e.g, chicago, hotel, hilton), suggesting that these features
are important to obtaining optimal classification performance. Unfortunately,
by relying on these highly context-specific features, it is not clear how well our
n-gram classifiers will generalize to other contexts. We further explore the effect
that the context of a deception has on detection performance in Chapter 4.
3.7 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we have studied the first large-scale dataset containing gold stan-
dard deceptive opinion spam. In particular, we have shown that the detection of
deceptive opinion spam is well beyond the capabilities of human judges, most
of whom perform roughly at-chance. Accordingly, we have introduced three
automated approaches to deceptive opinion spam detection, based on insights
coming from research in computational linguistics and psychology. We find
that while standard n-gram–based text categorization is the best individual de-
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tection approach, a combination approach using psycholinguistically-motivated
features and n-gram features can perform slightly better.
Finally, we have made several theoretical contributions. Specifically, our
findings suggest the importance of considering the context underlying a de-
ception (e.g., content n-gram features), rather than relying on coarse deception
cues (e.g., LIWC). We have also presented results based on the feature weights
learned by our classifiers that illustrate the difficulties faced by liars in encod-
ing spatial information. Lastly, we have discovered a plausible relationship be-
tween deceptive opinion spam and imaginative writing, based on POS distribu-
tional similarities.
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CHAPTER 4
THE EFFECTS OF CONTEXT ON DECEPTIVE OPINION SPAM
4.1 Introduction
Past deception research has narrowed in on a number of possible linguistic
cues to deception, which we explored in Chapter 3, including: (a) decreased spa-
tial detail, consistent with theories of reality monitoring [51]; (b) increased nega-
tive emotion terms, possibly due to “leakage” of guilt and other negative emo-
tions associated with lying [28, 39]; and (c) decreased first-person singular pronoun
use, often attributed to psychological distancing [39, 78]. However, recent re-
search has found that these cues are not universally observed across settings, or
contexts, leading some researchers to argue that cues to deception are context-
dependent [7, 78, 124].
Indeed, we found in Chapter 3 that Machine Learning classifiers trained on
the words of each review, or content n-gram features, rely heavily on context-
specific features in the training data. For example, our classifiers assigned large
weights to the features hilton and chicago, when trained on reviews of the
HILTON CHICAGO hotel. Accordingly, it is unclear whether our classifiers will
perform well at detecting deception in contexts that are different from the con-
text of the training data.
In this chapter, we investigate the generalizability of our Machine Learning
classifiers, introduced in Chapter 3, by measuring the influence that the con-
text of a deception has on classification performance. Specifically, we consider
deceptive opinion spam across three contextual dimensions:
1. Sentiment: Do linguistic cues to deceptive opinion spam vary with the
sentiment of an opinion, and if so, what influence does the sentiment of an
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opinion have on Machine Learning classification performance?
2. Domain: Do linguistic cues to deceptive opinion spam vary with the
domain, or topic, of a review, and if so, how important is it that Machine
Learning classifiers are trained and evaluated on data of the same domain?
3. Domain Expertise: Do authors with expert-level domain knowledge, or
domain experts, produce deceptive opinion spam with language that is dif-
ferent from that of non-experts, and if so, how can we detect deceptive
opinion spam written by domain experts?
First, in Section 4.2, we consider differences between positive- and negative-
sentiment deceptive opinion spam. We find that Machine Learning classi-
fication performance suffers when classifiers are trained and tested on re-
views of opposite sentiments, while classifiers trained on reviews of both senti-
ments, jointly, perform best overall. We then compare language features across
positive- and negative-sentiment reviews, and confirm that some cues to decep-
tion are dependent on the sentiment; for example, DECEPTIVE reviews generally
exaggerate the underlying sentiment of the review.
In Section 4.3, we explore the effects of domain-change on classifier perfor-
mance, using the classifiers learned in Chapter 3 and the restaurant review data
introduced in Sections 2.3.3 and 2.5.2. We find that classifiers trained and tested
on restaurant reviews, in general, outperform cross-domain classifiers that are
trained on hotel reviews and tested on restaurant reviews. However, we also
find that out-of-domain (HOTEL) data can be leveraged to improve classifica-
tion performance, when in-domain (RESTAURANT) training data is limited.
Finally, in Section 4.4, we investigate how deceptive opinion spam is in-
fluenced by the domain expertise of the reviewer. We compare three kinds
of reviews: (a) DECEPTIVE reviews written by crowdsourced Mechanical Turk
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workers (non-experts); (b) DECEPTIVE reviews written by hotel employess (do-
main experts), who have expert-level knowledge of their own hotels, in partic-
ular, and the hotels domain, in general; and (c) TRUTHFUL reviews written by
TripAdvisor users. We find that the three kinds of reviews are distinct in their
language use, and that linguistic cues to deceptive opinion spam written by ho-
tel employees (domain experts) and crowdsourced workers (non-experts) dif-
fer. Machine Learning classifiers, however, can distinguish between the three
classes with nearly 70% accuracy, or between any two out of three classes with
close to 80% accuracy.
4.2 Sentiment and Deception
In this section, we explore the relationship between sentiment and deception.
We perform our analysis on the positive-sentiment reviews used in Chapter 3,
combined with the negative-sentiment reviews introduced in Sections 2.3.2
(DECEPTIVE) and 2.5.1 (TRUTHFUL).
First, we evaluate human deception detection performance on the negative-
sentiment reviews, and find that humans are poor judges of deception, in line
with our findings for the positive-sentiment reviews in Section 3.3. We then
evaluate Machine Learning approaches to detecting negative deceptive opinion
spam, and compare classifiers trained and tested on reviews of the same sen-
timent, to those trained and tested on reviews of opposite sentiments. Finally,
we explore the interaction between sentiment and three hypothesized linguistic
features of deception, discussed in Section 4.1: (a) decreased spatial detail; (b)
increased negative emotion terms; and (c) changes in first-person singular use.
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Table 4.1: Deception detection performance, incl. (P)recision, (R)ecall, and (F)1-
score, for three human judges and two meta-judges on 160 negative-
sentiment reviews. Boldface denotes the largest value in each column.
MAJORITY and SKEPTIC meta-judges are described in Section 3.3.1.
TRUTHFUL DECEPTIVE
Accuracy P R F P R F
JUDGE 1 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0
JUDGE 2 61.9 63.0 57.5 60.1 60.9 66.3 63.5
JUDGE 3 57.5 57.3 58.8 58.0 57.7 56.3 57.0
MAJORITY 69.4 70.1 67.5 68.8 68.7 71.3 69.9
SKEPTIC 58.1 78.3 22.5 35.0 54.7 93.8 69.1
4.2.1 Human Performance
We first evaluate human deception detection performance on our negative de-
ceptive opinion spam dataset, introduced in Section 2.3.2 (DECEPTIVE) and Sec-
tion 2.5.1 (TRUTHFUL). Following our approach from Section 3.3 for positive-
sentiment reviews, we ask three volunteer undergraduate university students to
read and make assessments on a subset of the data, containing all 20 DECEPTIVE
and 20 TRUTHFUL negative-sentiment reviews from each of four hotels (160 re-
views total).
Results and Discussion
Performance for the three human judges is given in Table 4.1. Similarly to the
positive-sentiment reviews, we find that human judges perform poorly at iden-
tifying negative deceptive opinion spam. Nevertheless, only JUDGE 3 fails to re-
ject the null hypothesis of performing at-chance (two-tailed binomial p = 0.07).
Still, while the best human judge is accurate 65% of the time, inter-annotator
agreement between the judges is only slight at 0.07, computed using Fleiss’
kappa [59]. Moreover, the highest pairwise inter-annotator agreement is only
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0.26, computed using Cohen’s kappa, between JUDGE 1 and JUDGE 2. These low
agreements suggest that even when human judges perform better than chance
at detecting deceptive opinion spam, they are annotating different reviews as
deceptive, i.e., few reviews are consistently identified as deceptive.
4.2.2 Machine Learning Classifier Performance
We found in Chapter 3 that Machine Learning classifiers can detect posi-
tive deceptive opinion spam with state-of-the-art performance. However, we
also found that sentiment features were important in those models (see Sec-
tion 3.6.3), and it is therefore unclear how well models trained on reviews of one
sentiment will generalize to reviews of the opposite sentiment. In this subsec-
tion, we evaluate the performance of Machine Learning classifiers in three set-
tings, depending on whether we train and test classifiers on: (a) reviews of op-
posite sentiments (OPPOSITE-SENT); (b) reviews of the same sentiment (SAME-
SENT); or (c) reviews of both sentiments, jointly (JOINT-SENT).
Experimental Setup
In the OPPOSITE-SENT setting, each classifier is trained on all 800 reviews of one
sentiment, and tested on the held out set of 800 reviews of the opposite senti-
ment. In the SAME-SENT setting, we employ a 5-fold cross-validation (CV) pro-
cedure, described in Section 3.6.1, to evaluate classification performance when
train and test sentiments are the same. Finally, we consider two JOINT-SENT
settings, in which we train classifiers on both positive- and negative-sentiment
reviews, but with varying training set sizes. In the first JOINT-SENT setting, we
train classifiers on 400 reviews of each sentiment (800 reviews total), and test
them on the held out set of 800 reviews. In the second JOINT-SENT setting, we
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employ the 5-fold CV procedure, as before, but on the full combined set of 1600
reviews (800 positive-sentiment and 800 negative-sentiment).
We train and evaluate linear Support Vector Machine (SVM) classifiers with
unigram and bigram features (BIGRAMS+), which outperformed most other fea-
ture sets in the positive-sentiment setting (see Section 3.6.2). We tune all SVM
cost parameters, C, by nested CV on the training data. Note that the classifi-
cation performance reported previously in Table 3.2 is slightly different from
the positive-sentiment SAME-SENT results reported here, due to an updated to-
kenizer used in these experiments.
Results and Discussion
Results appear in Table 4.2. The results confirm that n-gram–based SVM clas-
sifiers can detect negative deceptive opinion spam in a balanced dataset with
performance far surpassing that of untrained human judges (cf. Table 4.1). Fur-
thermore, a one-tailed sign test shows that classifiers trained and tested on
reviews of different sentiments (OPPOSITE-SENT) perform significantly worse
(p = 0.013, 0.001 for POSITIVE and NEGATIVE test sentiments, respectively) than
classifiers trained and tested on reviews of the same sentiment (SAME-SENT),
despite having access to a greater number of training reviews.1 This suggests
that cues to deception differ depending on the sentiment of the text, which we
discuss further in Section 4.2.3.
We also observe that classifiers in the JOINT-SENT setting outperform their
corresponding classifiers in the OPPOSITE-SENT setting, even when the number
of reviews in the training set is controlled (800 reviews). Moreover, training
classifiers on the full 1600-review JOINT-SENT dataset results in performance
1SAME-SENT classifiers are trained on 80% of the available reviews (4 CV folds), whereas
OPPOSITE-SENT classifiers are trained on 100% of the available reviews.
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Table 4.2: SVM classifier performance for models trained and tested on re-
views of the same sentiment, different sentiments, or both (joint)
sentiments. Evaluation is performed via cross-validation or on
held out reviews, depending on the setting.
Number and Type
of Train Reviews TRUTHFUL DECEPTIVE
Test Sentiment Setting POSITIVE NEGATIVE Accuracy P R F P R F
POSITIVE SAME-SENT 800 - 89.5 90.3 88.5 89.4 88.7 90.5 89.6
(800 reviews) OPPOSITE-SENT - 800 81.4 76.3 91.0 83.0 88.9 71.8 79.4
JOINT-SENT 400 400 85.2 84.4 86.5 85.4 86.2 84.0 85.1
JOINT-SENT 800 800 88.5 87.9 89.2 88.6 89.1 87.8 88.4
NEGATIVE SAME-SENT - 800 86.6 86.2 87.2 86.7 87.1 86.0 86.5
(800 reviews) OPPOSITE-SENT 800 - 75.4 68.9 92.5 79.0 88.6 58.2 70.3
JOINT-SENT 400 400 86.0 87.1 84.5 85.8 85.0 87.5 86.2
JOINT-SENT 800 800 87.0 86.1 88.2 87.2 87.9 85.8 86.8
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that is comparable to classifiers in the SAME-SENT setting, both when testing
on positive-sentiment reviews (88.5% vs. 89.5% accuracy, two-tailed sign test
p = 0.80) and when testing on negative-sentiment reviews (87.0% vs. 86.6%
accuracy, p = 0.97). This result is explained in part, however, by the increased
training set size (1,280 vs. 640 reviews for 4 training folds).
Unfortunately, the quantity of features in n-gram classifiers prohibits a thor-
ough analysis of the improved generalizability of the JOINT-SENT classifiers
over the sentiment-specific classifiers. However, in the next subsection (Sec-
tion 4.2.3), we explore the linguistic cues to deception across sentiments, and
find that some cues to deception apply across sentiments, e.g., DECEPTIVE re-
views generally lack spatial details, compared to TRUTHFUL reviews. Thus, it is
likely that the JOINT-SENT classifiers place greater emphasis on these sentiment-
independent features, and less emphasis on sentiment-specific features.
4.2.3 Linguistic Cues to Deception Across Sentiments
We now explore how language features compare across positive- and negative-
sentiment, DECEPTIVE and TRUTHFUL reviews. In Table 4.3, we consider differ-
ences in three categories of language features, by comparing the sentiment- and
class-specific means and standard deviations of four LIWC categories: (a) spa-
tial details (space); (b) sentiment (pos emo and neg emo); and (c) first-person
singular pronouns (i).
Spatial Details We found in Section 3.6.3 that positive DECEPTIVE reviews
used fewer spatial terms (e.g., small, bathroom, on, floor, location), com-
pared to positive TRUTHFUL reviews (one-tailed t-test p = 5 × 10−5), because
Mechanical Turk authors never experienced the hotel and had less spatial de-
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Table 4.3: (M)eans and (S)tandard (D)eviations of four LIWC categories across 400
positive- and 400 negative-sentiment hotel reviews. The reported statis-
tics correspond to percentages of total word use in any given review.
Positive Sentiment Negative Sentiment
TRUTHFUL DECEPTIVE TRUTHFUL DECEPTIVE
Category M (%) SD (%) M SD M SD M SD
space 8.07 2.63 7.36 2.51 7.71 2.59 7.44 2.11
posemo 5.83 2.55 6.44 2.51 2.51 1.70 2.24 1.37
negemo 0.46 0.64 0.24 0.50 1.42 1.03 1.68 1.23
i 2.18 2.04 4.36 2.96 2.85 2.23 4.47 2.83
tails available for their review [51]. This was similarly the case for the nega-
tive reviews, with more spatial details (the LIWC space category) in negative
TRUTHFUL reviews, compared to negative DECEPTIVE reviews (p = 0.049).
Sentiment Previous research has found that deception is often correlated with
increased negative emotion terms [78], possibly due to guilt on the part of the
deceiver [39], and corresponding “leakage cues” [28]. In agreement with these
previous findings, we find that negative DECEPTIVE reviews use more negative
emotion terms (the LIWC neg emo cateogry), compared to negative TRUTHFUL
reviews (one-tailed t-test p = 5 × 10−4). In contrast, we found in Chapter 3
that positive DECEPTIVE reviews were generally more positive in sentiment than
positive TRUTHFUL reviews (p = 4 × 10−4). Combined, our results suggest that
DECEPTIVE reviews exaggerate the underlying review sentiment.
First-Person Singular Pronouns We found in Section 3.6.3 that among
positive-sentiment reviews, first-person singular use was more frequent in
DECEPTIVE, compared to TRUTHFUL reviews, in contrast to previous studies
of deception [78]. While we observe a similar effect among negative-sentiment
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reviews, the magnitude of the difference is smaller in the negative reviews, com-
pared to the positive reviews. In particular, the rates among positive and neg-
ative DECEPTIVE reviews remain similar (M=4.36% vs. M=4.47%, respectively;
two-tailed t-test p = 0.59), but the rates increase 31% from positive TRUTHFUL
to negative TRUTHFUL reviews (M=2.18% vs. M=2.85%, respectively; one-tailed
t-test p = 5 × 10−6). One possible explanation for the increased focus on self
in negative TRUTHFUL, compared to positive TRUTHFUL reviews, is that nega-
tive TRUTHFUL reviews reflect the frustration and anxiety of a real-life negative
customer experience [42], which may result in increased usage of first-person
singular [97].
4.3 Domain Topic and Deception
It is also important when training Machine Learning classifiers to consider the
domain (or topic) of the training data, in relation to the data on which the clas-
sifier will be evaluated. For example, we observed in Section 3.6.3 that n-gram–
based Machine Learning classifiers rely on features that are highly specific to
the domain of the training data (e.g, hilton, chicago, hotel). Accordingly,
those classifiers are unlikely to perform well at detecting deception in domains
that are very different from the training domain.
In this section, we explore how the domain of a deception influences clas-
sification performance, by training Machine Learning classifiers on reviews
from one domain (HOTELS), and evaluating their ability to distinguish between
DECEPTIVE and TRUTHFUL reviews from another domain (RESTAURANTS). We
have chosen to use restaurants as our second domain, because of the strong
similarities between restaurant and hotel reviews, which allow us to explore
the subtle effects of domain change.
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In general, we find that classification performance suffers when train and
test domains differ. However, we also find that we can leverage out-of-domain
training data, in combination with in-domain training data, to learn models that
perform slightly better than those that use only in-domain data.
4.3.1 Experimental Setup
We frame our problem as a domain adaptation task [89], where we are given
a large set of labeled training data from one domain (HOTELS), and our goal
it to learn a classifier that performs well on data from a different domain
(RESTAURANTS). In particular, we train our classifiers on positive-sentiment
hotel reviews, used in Chapter 3, and evaluate classification performance on
positive-sentiment restaurant reviews, which we introduced in Section 2.3.3
(DECEPTIVE) and Section 2.5.2 (TRUTHFUL).
We compare linear Support Vector Machine (SVM) classifiers trained on
three feature sets: POS, LIWC, and BIGRAMS+ (described in Section 3.5). We eval-
uate these classifiers on 400 restaurant reviews using the 5-fold nested cross-
validation procedure from Section 3.6.1. Each test fold contains 20 DECEPTIVE
and 20 TRUTHFUL reviews from each of two restaurants (80 reviews total).
We explore three training settings. In the first setting (IN-DOMAIN), we eval-
uate in-domain cross-validation performance on the 400 restaurant reviews. In
the second setting (CROSS-DOMAIN), we train a classifier on 800 hotel reviews,
i.e., out-of-domain data, and evaluate its performance on 400 held out restau-
rant reviews. In the third and fourth settings (JOINT-DOMAIN), we train classi-
fiers on a combination of in-domain (RESTAURANT) and out-of-domain (HOTEL)
reviews, in varying quantities, and evaluate their performance on the restaurant
reviews via cross-validation.
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Table 4.4: SVM classifier performance on 400 RESTAURANT reviews.
Classifiers are trained on varying quantities of in-domain
(RESTAURANT) and out-of-domain (HOTEL) reviews.
Number and Type
of Train Reviews TRUTHFUL DECEPTIVE
Setting HOTELS RESTAURANTS Features Accuracy P R F P R F
IN-DOMAIN - 400 POS 72.8 72.0 74.5 73.2 73.6 71.0 72.3
LIWC 76.2 77.5 74.0 75.7 75.1 78.5 76.8
BIGRAMS+ 84.8 82.9 87.5 85.2 86.8 82.0 84.3
CROSS-DOMAIN 800 - POS 70.8 66.8 82.5 73.8 77.1 59.0 66.9
LIWC 75.2 73.9 78.0 75.9 76.7 72.5 74.5
BIGRAMS+ 81.5 79.7 84.5 82.0 83.5 78.5 80.9
JOINT-DOMAIN 800 200 POS 72.2 68.5 82.5 74.8 78.0 62.0 69.1
LIWC 77.2 77.1 77.5 77.3 77.4 77.0 77.2
BIGRAMS+ 85.2 83.4 88.0 85.6 87.3 82.5 84.8
JOINT-DOMAIN 800 400 POS 72.2 69.3 80.0 74.2 76.3 64.5 69.9
LIWC 78.2 78.4 78.0 78.2 78.1 78.5 78.3
BIGRAMS+ 86.8 86.9 86.5 86.7 86.6 87.0 86.8
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4.3.2 Results and Discussion
Results are given in Table 4.4. Reference performance is given by our IN-
DOMAIN setting, corresponding to cross-validation on the 400 restaurant re-
views. In this setting, we once again find that BIGRAM+ features perform best,
similar to our findings for hotel reviews in Section 3.6.
Cross-domain results are given by our CROSS-DOMAIN setting, where a clas-
sifier is trained on 800 out-of-domain (HOTEL) reviews and tested on 400 held
out in-domain (RESTAURANT) reviews. We observe that classification perfor-
mance is worse in the CROSS-DOMAIN, compared to the IN-DOMAIN training
setting, despite using double the training data (800 out-of-domain vs. 400 in-
domain reviews). Notably, while BIGRAM+ features still perform best, POS and
LIWC features are more robust across domains, i.e., there is less difference in
performance between in-domain and out-of-domain training settings for these
features. This confirms that POS and LIWC features are more domain indepen-
dent than n-gram features, although they remain uncompetitive, in general.
In our third and fourth settings (JOINT-DOMAIN), we evaluate classifiers
trained on a combination of in-domain (RESTAURANT) and out-of-domain
(HOTEL) reviews. We find that a joint-domain classifier trained on just 200 in-
domain (RESTAURANT) reviews, combined with 800 out-of-domain (HOTEL) re-
views, achieves higher accuracy than using a fully in-domain classifier trained
on the full 400 in-domain (RESTAURANT) reviews (85.2% vs. 84.8% accuracy,
respectively, using BIGRAM+ features), although the increase is not significant
(one-tailed sign test p = 0.36). Moreover, combining the full 400 in-domain
(RESTAURANT) and 800 out-of-domain (HOTEL) reviews results in even better
performance (86.2% vs. 84.8% accuracy, using BIGRAM+ features), although the
increase is not significant (one-tailed p = 0.29).
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Table 4.5: (M)eans and (S)tandard (D)eviations of six selected LIWC categories
across 800 positive HOTEL reviews and 400 positive RESTAURANT re-
views. The reported statistics correspond to percentages of total word
use in any given review.
HOTEL Reviews RESTAURANT Reviews
TRUTHFUL DECEPTIVE TRUTHFUL DECEPTIVE
Category M (%) SD (%) M SD M SD M SD
home 2.88 1.57 2.60 1.70 0.42 0.63 0.63 0.78
ingest 1.30 1.40 1.08 1.25 3.94 2.02 3.99 1.93
space 8.07 2.63 7.36 2.51 5.77 2.41 4.67 2.18
pos emo 5.83 2.55 6.44 2.51 5.13 2.26 6.48 2.34
neg emo 0.46 0.64 0.24 0.50 0.46 0.61 0.40 0.62
i 2.18 2.04 4.36 2.96 2.03 1.87 4.42 2.21
4.3.3 Linguistic Cues to Deception Across Domains
We now explore how language features compare across hotel and restaurant
reviews. In Table 4.5, we consider differences in four categories of language
features, by comparing the domain- and class-specific means and standard de-
viations of six LIWC categories: (a) domain-specific details (home and ingest);
(b) spatial details (space); (c) sentiment (pos emo and neg emo); and (d) first-
person singular pronouns (i).
Domain-Specific Details First, we observe some domain-specific differences
between hotel and restaurant reviews. Hotel reviews, for example, compared
to restaurant reviews, use significantly more terms relating to personal concerns,
such as the LIWC home category (M=2.88% vs. M=0.42% for TRUTHFUL reviews
and M=2.60% vs. M=0.63% for DECEPTIVE reviews, respectively). On the other
hand, restaurant reviews, compared to hotel reviews, generally use more terms
relating to biological processes, such as the LIWC ingest category (M=3.94%
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vs. M=1.30% for TRUTHFUL reviews and M=3.99% vs. M=1.08% for DECEPTIVE
reviews, respectively). However, there is little difference between DECEPTIVE
and TRUTHFUL reviews within these categories.
Spatial Details We found in Section 3.6.3 and Section 4.2.3 that DECEPTIVE re-
views, compared to TRUTHFUL reviews, use fewer spatial terms (e.g., small,
floor, location, and the LIWC space category). Similarly, we find that
DECEPTIVE restaurant reviews, compared to TRUTHFUL restaurant reviews, use
significantly fewer spatial terms (M=4.67% vs. M=5.77%, respectively, for the
LIWC space category; one-tailed t-test p = 1.4 × 10−6). However, we also ob-
serve that spatial terms are very significantly less frequent in restaurant reviews,
on average, compared to hotel reviews (M=4.67% vs. M=7.36%, respectively, for
DECEPTIVE reviews, and M=5.77% vs. M=8.07%, respectively, for TRUTHFUL re-
views).
Sentiment We observe that DECEPTIVE restaurant reviews are more positive
in sentiment, on average, compared to TRUTHFUL restaurant reviews (M=6.48%
vs. M=5.13%, respectively; one-tailed t-test p = 5.0 × 10−9). This finding is sim-
ilar to our findings for positive-sentiment hotel reviews, where DECEPTIVE re-
views exaggerate the underlying sentiment of the review (see Section 3.6.3). No-
tably, hotel and restaurant reviews use sentiment terms with similar relative
frequencies.
First-Person Singular Pronouns For restaurant reviews, we once again ob-
serve that DECEPTIVE reviews use first-person singular pronouns with greater
frequency, relative to TRUTHFUL reviews (M=4.42% vs. M=2.03%, respectively;
one-tailed t-test p = 2.2 × 10−16). However, the relative difference in first-person
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singular pronoun use between hotel and restaurant reviews is small.
4.4 Domain Expertise and Deception
The final contextual dimension that we explore is the effect of domain expertise
on deception. Specifically, this section considers deceptive reviews written by
hotel employees, who are domain experts in the HOTELS domain, and who possess
substantial spatial knowledge of their own hotels. Importantly, hotel employees
are a plausible source of real-world fake hotel reviews, and the domain knowl-
edge possessed by these employees may enable them to craft deceptive reviews
that are more difficult for classifiers to detect, compared to the crowdsourced
DECEPTIVE reviews considered thus far.
For example, we found in Chapter 3 and Section 4.2 that crowdsourced
DECEPTIVE hotel reviews, compared to TRUTHFUL hotel reviews, include fewer
spatial details (e.g., small, bathroom, on, floor, location); accordingly,
classifiers trained on these reviews weight spatial details heavily in the direc-
tion of the TRUTHFUL class. It is not clear, however, whether a lack of spatial
detail indicates deception, in general, or if it is instead an artifact of reviews
written by crowdsourced workers, who have no experience with the hotel they
are reviewing. In this section, we investigate some of the similarities and differ-
ences between domain expert deceptive opinion spam, crowdsourced deceptive
opinion spam, and TRUTHFUL reviews.
4.4.1 Experimental Setup
In previous sections and chapters, we have considered a binary classification
task, in which the goal is to predict whether a given review is DECEPTIVE (de-
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ceptive opinion spam) or TRUTHFUL (not deceptive opinion spam). In this sec-
tion, we reframe our task as a multi-class classification task, in which the goal
is to classify reviews according to their source: TripAdvisor (TRUTHFUL), Me-
chanical Turk (MTURK), or a hotel employee (EMPLOYEE).
We use a One-versus-Rest (OvR) classification scheme, in which we train m
binary classifiers, such that each classifier, fi, for i ∈ [1,m], is trained to distin-
guish between class i, on the one hand, and all classes except i, on the other. To
make an m-way classification decision, we then choose the class, c, correspond-
ing to the classifier, fc, with the most confident prediction. OvR approaches
have been shown to produce state-of-the-art performance, compared to other
multi-class approaches, such as Multinomial Naı¨ve Bayes [106] and One-vs-One
classification schemes [107]. We train OvR multi-class linear SVM classifiers on
three feature sets: POS, LIWC, and BIGRAMS+ (described in Section 3.5).
We use the dataset that we introduced in Section 2.4. In particular, our
dataset contains EMPLOYEE reviews written by two employees from each of
seven hotels. Accordingly, we report 7-fold cross-validation performance,
where each fold contains the EMPLOYEE reviews written by two employees from
a single hotel, as well as the corresponding TRUTHFUL and MTURK reviews.
4.4.2 Results and Discussion
Multi-class classification results are given in Table 4.6. We report both OvR (3-
CLASS) performance, and the performance of three One-versus-One binary clas-
sifiers, trained to distinguish between each pair of classes.
Once again, BIGRAMS+ feature perform best, approaching 70% accuracy on
the 3-class classification task, where a random-guess baseline is just 33.3% ac-
curate. We also observe that each of the three One-versus-One binary clas-
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Table 4.6: Multi-class SVM classifier performance on 280 mixed-sentiment
reviews from each of three sources: TripAdvisor (TRUTHFUL),
Mechanical Turk (MTURK), and hotel employees (EMPLOYEE).
TRUTHFUL MTURK EMPLOYEE
Setting Features Accuracy P R F P R F P R F
3-CLASS POS 49.2 52.7 64.6 58.0 48.1 45.7 46.9 45.3 37.5 41.0
LIWC 57.2 61.1 61.3 61.2 53.0 59.6 56.1 58.2 50.7 54.2
BIGRAMS+ 69.9 69.7 73.7 71.6 69.2 71.4 70.3 71.0 64.6 67.7
TRUTHFUL vs. MTURK BIGRAMS+ 80.1 79.9 79.9 79.9 80.4 80.4 80.4 − − −
TRUTHFUL vs. EMPLOYEE BIGRAMS+ 80.0 77.1 84.7 80.7 − − − 83.4 75.4 79.2
MTURK vs. EMPLOYEE BIGRAMS+ 77.5 − − − 74.1 84.6 79.0 82.1 70.4 75.8
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Table 4.7: (M)eans and (S)tandard (D)eviations of four selected LIWC categories
across 140 positive- and 140 negative-sentiment hotel reviews from
three sources: TripAdvisor (TRUTHFUL), Mechanical Turk (MTURK),
and hotel employees (EMPLOYEE). The reported statistics correspond
to percentages of total word use in any given review.
TRUTHFUL MTURK EMPLOYEE
Sentiment Category M (%) SD (%) M SD M SD
POSITIVE space 7.48 2.92 7.22 2.38 7.60 3.48
posemo 5.87 1.95 6.05 2.29 6.54 3.99
negemo 0.44 0.69 0.29 0.48 0.27 0.67
i 2.44 2.36 3.61 2.64 2.89 3.03
NEGATIVE space 7.34 2.53 7.25 2.54 6.81 2.99
posemo 3.58 1.91 2.14 1.80 2.65 2.04
negemo 1.15 1.16 1.68 1.10 1.54 1.53
i 2.60 2.25 4.23 3.16 4.19 3.48
sifiers perform significantly better than chance, suggesting that TRUTHFUL,
MTURK and EMPLOYEE reviews are, in fact, three distinct classes. In particular,
BIGRAMS+ features are 77.5% accurate at distinguishing between MTURK and
EMPLOYEE reviews, despite that both kinds of reviews are deceptive opinion
spam, and that the two datasets are controlled to have equal numbers of re-
views across sentiments and hotels. We explore the differences and similarities
between MTURK and EMPLOYEE reviews further in Section 4.4.3.
4.4.3 Linguistic Cues to Deception by Domain Experts
We now explore how language features compare across TRUTHFUL, MTURK and
EMPLOYEE reviews. In Table 4.7, we consider differences in three categories
of language features, by comparing the class-specific means and standard de-
viations of four LIWC categories: (a) spatial details (space); (b) sentiment
(pos emo and neg emo); and (c) first-person singular pronouns (i).
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We additionally separate the results by the sentiment of the review. This
is important, because our hotel employee authors wrote positive-sentiment
reviews when reviewing their own hotels, and negative-sentiment reviews
when reviewing their competitor’s hotels (see the description of the dataset
in Section 2.4). Thus, we expect positive-sentiment EMPLOYEE reviews to ex-
hibit greater spatial awareness, due to reviewing their own hotel, compared to
negative-sentiment EMPLOYEE reviews.
Spatial Details In agreement with our expectations, hotel employees encode
significantly more spatial information into their lies when reviewing their own
hotel (i.e., the positive-sentiment EMPLOYEE reviews; M=7.60%), compared to
when reviewing a competitor’s hotel (i.e., the negative-sentiment EMPLOYEE
reviews; M=6.81%; one-tailed t-test p = 0.02). These findings suggest that a lack
of spatial details may not be a universal cue to deception, but rather, it is an
artifact of reviews written by authors who have no prior experience with the
hotel they are reviewing. Moreover, it appears that general domain expertise
does not compensate for this lack of prior experience, as demonstrated by the
lack of spatial details in the negative-sentiment EMPLOYEE reviews.
Also in line with our expectations, and our previous findings in Sec-
tions 3.6.3, 4.2.3 and 4.3.3, we observe that MTURK reviews have fewer spatial
terms, on average, compared to TRUTHFUL reviews, although the differences are
not statistically significant in this case, potentially due to the smaller dataset size
(one-tailed t-test p = 0.20, 0.39, for positive- and negative-sentiment reviews, re-
spectively).
Sentiment With respect to sentiment, we once again observe that DECEPTIVE
reviews (both MTURK and EMPLOYEE), relative to TRUTHFUL reviews, exag-
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gerate the underlying sentiment of the review. All pairwise differences in Ta-
ble 4.7 between DECEPTIVE (MTURK or EMPLOYEE) and TRUTHFUL reviews, for
the posemo and negemo categories, are significant at the p < 0.05 level, ex-
cept for the difference in posemo between positive-sentiment MTURK reviews
(M=6.05%) and positive-sentiment TRUTHFUL reviews (M=5.87%), where the
difference is not significant (p = 0.25).
First-Person Singular Pronouns We also observe increased use of first-person
singular pronouns in both of the DECEPTIVE review conditions (MTURK and
EMPLOYEE), relative to TRUTHFUL reviews. In particular, all pairwise differ-
ences in Table 4.7 between DECEPTIVE (MTURK or EMPLOYEE) and TRUTHFUL
reviews, for the i category, are significant at a p < 0.05 level, except between
positive-sentiment EMPLOYEE and TRUTHFUL reviews, where the difference is
not significant (M=2.89% vs. M=2.44%, respectively; p = 0.09). Thus, increased
usage of first-person singular pronouns appears to be a relatively consistent cue
to deceptive opinion spam in our data.
4.5 Discussion and Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we have demonstrated how three contextual factors, including
the sentiment of a review, the domain of a review, and the domain expertise of the
reviewer, can influence cues to deception, and the ability of Machine Learning
classifiers to detect deceptive opinion spam.
First, we have shown that DECEPTIVE reviews vary across sentiments, and
generally exaggerate the underlying review sentiment, compared to TRUTHFUL
reviews. We have also shown that classifiers trained and tested on reviews of the
same sentiment outperform classifiers trained and tested on reviews of opposite
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sentiments. Notably, classifiers trained on reviews of both sentiments, jointly,
perform best overall.
Next, we have shown that reviews of different domains vary in their use of
certain categories of words; for example, restaurant reviews include fewer spa-
tial details than hotel reviews, but more words relating to biological processes,
such as the LIWC ingest category. Nevertheless, classifiers trained on reviews
from one domain (e.g., HOTELS) perform reasonably well at detecting deceptive
reviews in another domain (e.g., RESTAURANTS). Moreover, we show that in
cases where in-domain training data is limited, we can leverage out-of-domain
training data to improve classification performance.
Lastly, we have shown that reviews written by hotel employees (domain
experts) are distinct from both TRUTHFUL and crowdsourced (i.e., non-expert)
DECEPTIVE reviews. We have shown that a One-versus-Rest multi-class classi-
fier can distinguish between the three classes with nearly 70% accuracy, while
binary classifiers can distinguish between any two out of three classes with close
to 80% accuracy. Finally, we have shown that a lack of spatial details may be an
artifact of reviews written by authors who have no experience with the hotel
they are reviewing, rather than a universal cue to deceptive opinion spam.
In general, our findings in this chapter highlight the importance of modeling
the context of a lie, in studies of deception, and provide examples of some of the
ways in which cues to deception may vary across contexts.
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CHAPTER 5
ESTIMATING THE PREVALENCE OF DECEPTIVE OPINION SPAM
5.1 Introduction
Perhaps surprisingly, relatively little is known about the actual prevalence, or
rate, of deception in online review communities, and less still is known about
the factors that can influence it. On the one hand, the relative ease of producing
reviews, combined with the pressure for businesses, products, and services to
be perceived in a positive light, suggests that deceptive reviews may be quite
common. On the other hand, consumers increasingly rely on online reviews to
make purchase decisions [18, 46], suggesting that consumers find the informa-
tion contained in those reviews to be accurate.
Estimating the prevalence of deception in online review communities is chal-
lenging, however, because gold standard annotations of deception are not avail-
able for real-world reviews, and neither human judgements nor self-reports of
deception are reliable either (see the discussion in Chapter 2). In this chapter,
we propose an approach for estimating the prevalence of deception in an online
review community, based on the output of the Machine Learning classifiers in
Chapter 3.
More generally, we investigate the prevalence of deceptive opinion spam in
online review communities through three questions:
1. Prevalence Estimation: In the absence of gold standard annotations, can
we use a noisy deception classifier to estimate the prevalence of deceptive
opinion spam in a review community?
2. Influencing Factors: What factors influence the prevalence of deception
in a review community?
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3. Prevalence Reduction: What actions, if any, can be taken to reduce the
prevalence of deception in a review community?
First, we introduce the Bayesian Prevalence Model (see Section 5.3)—a genera-
tive model of deception that jointly models the uncertainty of a deception classi-
fier, as well as the ground-truth deceptiveness of each review. Inference for this
model, which we perform via Gibbs sampling, allows us to estimate bounds
on the prevalence of deception in a review community, without requiring gold
standard annotations of deception.
We then reason about the factors that influence deception prevalence in on-
line review communities (see Section 5.4). We argue that reviews are signals to
the true, unknown quality of a product or service offering, and act to diminish
the information asymmetry between past and prospective customers [44, 117].
Accordingly, deceptive opinion spam is a false signal, and the prevalence of de-
ception among online reviews is a function of the signaling costs and benefits
associated with posting fake reviews. We hypothesize that review communities
with low signaling cost, such as communities that make it easy to post a review,
and large benefits, such as highly trafficked sites, will attract more deceptive
opinion spam than will communities with higher signaling costs, such as com-
munities that establish additional requirements for posting reviews, and lower
benefits, such as low site traffic.
We apply our approach to positive-sentiment Chicago hotel reviews in
six online hotel review communities: Expedia, Hotels.com, Orbitz, Priceline,
TripAdvisor, and Yelp. We find first that the prevalence of deception indeed
varies by community. However, because it is not possible to validate these esti-
mates empirically (i.e., gold standard rates of deception in each community are
unknown), we focus our discussion instead on the relative differences in the es-
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timated rates of deception between communities. Here, the results confirm our
hypotheses and suggest that deception is most prevalent in communities with
a low signal cost. Importantly, when measures are taken to increase a commu-
nity’s signal cost, we find reductions in our estimated rates of deception in that
community.
5.2 Related Work
The focus of most previous spam research in the context of online reviews has
been on detection (see related work in Section 3.2). Indeed, there are few empiri-
cal, scholarly studies of the prevalence of deceptive opinion spam.
Notably, as we discussed in Section 2.2.2, Mayzlin et al. [67] reason about the
economic incentives for posting deceptive hotel reviews by comparing a hotel’s
rating distribution on TripAdvisor, where anyone can create an account and
post a review, to the same hotels’ rating distribution on Expedia, where a veri-
fied purchase is required before a user can post a review. They apply a difference
of differences approach to control for factors specific to each review community,
and examine the relative degree of review manipulation between different cate-
gories of hotels, e.g., independent vs. chain hotels, small vs. large owner hotels,
and hotels with small vs. large management companies. Importantly, they find
review manipulation to be relatively insignificant, with the biggest difference
between hotel categories occurring between small independent hotels and large
chain hotels, with the former posting an estimated 7 additional fake positive
reviews (out of 120), relative to the latter.
Our approach is also related to studies of disease prevalence, in which
gold standard diagnostic testing is either too expensive, or impossible to per-
form [53, 54]. In such cases, the prevalence of disease in a population is esti-
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mated using a combination of an imperfect diagnostic test, and estimates of the
test’s positive and negative recall rates. For example, Joseph et al. [54] propose
a Bayesian model, similar to our own, that models the total number of true pos-
itives and false negatives produced by an imperfect diagnostic test. However,
while pilot experiments confirm that their model performs similarly to our own,
the generative story of our model, given in Section 5.3, is comparatively more
intuitive.
Finally, work in Machine Learning has explored classification settings where
the distribution of the classes in the test data is different from the class dis-
tribution observed at train time. In particular, Saerens et al. [111] propose an
approach to estimate the unknown class distribution in a test set, based on Ex-
pectation Maximization (EM), using a classifier’s output probabilities on the test
data, and the known class distribution in the training data. Unfortunately, the
EM approach does not produce bounds on its estimates, as our approach does,
although the point estimates of the two approaches are similar.
5.3 Bayesian Prevalence Model
The Bayesian Prevalence Model (BAYES) uses the output of our Machine Learn-
ing classifiers, introduced in Chapter 3, to estimate the prevalence of deception
in a group of reviews. Unfortunately, our classifiers can produce both false pos-
itive and false negative predictions, and, therefore, cannot be relied on directly.
Moreover, if the probability of a false positive prediction is different from the
probability of a false negative prediction, then the error of the estimates pro-
duced by our classifier will vary depending on the true rate of deception.
To address these challenges, BAYES jointly models our classifier’s false pos-
itive and false negative rates, as well as the true rate of deception. Specifically,
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BAYES models the generative process through which deception occurs, includ-
ing the true (latent) rate of deception (pi∗), the classifier’s true (latent) decep-
tive recall, or sensitivity (η∗), and truthful recall, or specificity (θ∗). Formally,
BAYES assumes that our data was generated according to the following genera-
tive story, where for each review, indexed by i, the (latent) ground truth label is
given by yi ∈ {0, 1}, and the (observed) classifier prediction is given by f (xi):
• Sample the true rate of deception: pi∗ ∼ Beta(α)
• Sample the classifier’s true sensitivity: η∗ ∼ Beta(β)
• Sample the classifier’s true specificity: θ∗ ∼ Beta(γ)
• For each review, indexed by i:
– Sample the review’s ground truth deception label:
yi ∼ Bernoulli(pi∗)
– Sample the classifier’s prediction:
f (xi) ∼

Bernoulli(η∗) if yi = 1
Bernoulli(1 − θ∗) if yi = 0
The corresponding graphical model is given in plate notation in Figure 5.1,
where shaded and unshaded nodes indicate observed and latent variables, re-
spectively, and directed edges denote dependencies between variables. Notice
that by placing Beta prior distributions on pi∗, η∗, and θ∗, BAYES enables us to
encode our prior knowledge about the true rate of deception, as well as our un-
certainty about the estimates of the classifier’s sensitivity and specificity. This is
discussed further in Section 5.5.2.
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Figure 5.1: The Bayesian Prevalence Model in plate notation. Shaded nodes rep-
resent observed variables, and arrows denote dependence. For exam-
ple, f (xi) is observed, and depends on η∗, θ∗, and yi.
Inference
While exact inference is intractable for the Bayesian Prevalence Model, an alter-
native way of approximating the desired posterior distribution is with Markov
Chain Monte Carlo Gibbs sampling. Gibbs sampling works by sampling each
variable, in turn, from the conditional distribution of that variable given all
other variables in the model. After repeating this procedure for many itera-
tions, the desired posterior distribution can be approximated from samples in
the chain by: (1) discarding a number of initial burn-in iterations, and (2) thin-
ning the number of remaining samples according to a sampling lag, since adja-
cent samples in the chain are often highly correlated.
The conditional distributions of each variable, given the others, can be de-
rived from the joint distribution. Based on the graphical representation of
BAYES, given in Figure 5.1, the joint distribution of the observed and latent vari-
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ables is given by:
Pr( f (x), y, pi∗, η∗, θ∗;α,β,γ)
= Pr( f (x) | y, η∗, θ∗) · Pr(y | pi∗) · Pr(pi∗ |α) · Pr(η∗ |β) · Pr(θ∗ |γ), (5.1)
where each term is given by the sampling distributions specified in the genera-
tive story in Section 5.3.
A common technique to simplify the joint distribution, and the sampling
process, is to integrate out (collapse) variables that do not need to be sampled. If
we integrate out pi∗, η∗, and θ∗ from Equation 5.1, we can derive a collapsed Gibbs
sampler that only needs to sample the yi’s at each iteration. The resulting sam-
pling equations, and the corresponding Bayesian Prevalence Model estimate of
the prevalence of deception, pi∗, are given in greater detail in Appendix A.1.
5.4 Signal Theory
In terms of economic theory, the role of online reviews is to reduce the inher-
ent information asymmetry between prospective customers, on the one hand, and
past customers and sellers, on the other [44]. It follows that if reviews regularly
failed to reduce this information asymmetry, or, worse, convey false informa-
tion, then they would cease to be of value to the user. And while users do,
in fact, value online reviews [18, 46], there remains widespread concern about
deception in online review communities.
Unfortunately, our understanding of the prevalence of deceptive opinion
spam is limited (see related work in Section 5.2). Moreover, it is not possi-
ble to empirically validate the estimates produced by our Bayesian Prevalence
Model (Section 5.3), because we do not have ground truth labels of deception
for real-world reviews. However, by framing reviews as signals to a product’s
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true (unknown) quality [44, 117], we can reason about the prevalence of decep-
tive opinion spam as a function of the costs and benefits associated with posting
fake reviews.
First, consider the benefits associated with posting deceptive opinion spam.
A business is benefited by posting a fake positive review when a prospective
customer reads and is influenced by that review, especially when making a pur-
chase decision. Moreover, this exposure benefit varies by review community,
and is proportional to the size of the community’s audience. Therefore, we ar-
gue that deception will be more prevalent in review communities with a high
exposure benefit, such as highly trafficked sites, compared to communities with
low exposure benefit, for example, sites with low traffic.
We next consider the costs associated with posting deceptive opinion spam.
In general, the costs of deception are broad and may include psychological and
emotional costs [23], as well as reputational costs [67]. Here, we consider only
the posting cost, or the direct monetary and time costs associated with posting
a review in a review community. Posting costs also vary by review commu-
nity, with some communities verifying purchases before allowing reviews to be
posted, and others hiding or filtering reviews written by new or inexperienced
reviewers. We argue that review communities that implement these costs, i.e.,
communities with a high posting cost, will contain less deceptive opinion spam
compared to communities with a low posting cost.
Observe that both posting costs and exposure benefits depend entirely on the
review community. An overview of these factors for each of the six review com-
munities is given in Table 5.1. Note that we have used the number of Chicago
hotel reviews in each community to determine the exposure benefit.
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Table 5.1: Signal costs associated with six online review communities, sorted ap-
proximately from highest signal cost to lowest. The posting cost is High
if users are required to purchase a product before reviewing it, and Low
otherwise. The exposure benefit is Low, Medium, or High based on the
number of reviews in the community (see Table 2.2).
Community Posting Cost Exposure Benefit
Orbitz High Low
Priceline High Medium
Expedia High Medium
Hotels.com High Medium
Yelp Low Low
TripAdvisor Low High
5.4.1 Hypotheses
Based on the posting costs and exposure benefits just defined, we propose two
hypotheses, which we test in Section 5.6:
• Hypothesis 1: Review communities that have low posting costs and high
exposure benefits, such as TripAdvisor and Yelp, will have more deception
than communities with higher posting costs and comparatively lower ex-
posure benefits, such as Orbitz.
• Hypothesis 2: Increasing the posting cost will reduce the prevalence of
deception in a review community.
5.5 Experimental Setup
We apply the Bayesian Prevalence Model to reviews in six hotel review com-
munities: Expedia, Hotels.com, Orbitz, Priceline, TripAdvisor, and Yelp. We
train our classifiers using the procedure given in Section 5.5.1. We then estimate
each classifier’s sensitivity and specificity using the procedure outlined in Sec-
tion 5.5.2 and given in Appendix A.2. Gibbs sampling for the Bayesian Preva-
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lence Model is performed using Equations A.1 and A.2 (given in Appendix A.1)
for 70,000 iterations, with a burn-in of 20,000 iterations, and a sampling lag of 50.
We use an uninformative (uniform) prior for pi∗, i.e., α = 〈1, 1〉. Multiple runs are
performed to verify the stability of the results.
5.5.1 Deception Classifier
The Bayesian Prevalence Model (Section 5.3) relies on the output of a de-
ception classifier, which predicts whether an unlabeled review is DECEPTIVE
or TRUTHFUL. Accordingly, we train supervised Support Vector Machine
(SVM) classifiers on n-gram features (BIGRAMS+), which performed well on our
TripAdvisor hotel review experiments in Chapter 3.
As before, we train our classifier on 20 positive-sentiment DECEPTIVE hotel
reviews from each of 20 Chicago hotels, as described in Section 2.3.1. How-
ever, in order to apply our prevalence model to review communities other than
TripAdvisor, it is important that we train the underlying classifier on a broad
sample of TRUTHFUL reviews from several review communities. Therefore, we
pair the DECEPTIVE reviews with 20 positive-sentiment (5-star) TRUTHFUL re-
views from each of the same 20 Chicago hotels, randomly sampled from six
online hotel review communities (see Section 2.5.1), instead of just TripAdvisor.
5.5.2 Classifier Sensitivity and Specificity
The Bayesian Prevalence Model additionally exploits prior knowledge of the
underlying deception classifier’s deceptive recall rate, or sensitivity (η∗), and
truthful recall rate, or specificity (θ∗). While it is not possible to obtain gold stan-
dard values for these parameters, we can obtain rough estimates of their values
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Table 5.2: Reference DECEPTIVE recall (sensitivity) and TRUTHFUL recall (speci-
ficity) of an SVM classifier trained on reviews from six communities.
Sensitivity is based on 5-fold cross-validation performance, while speci-
ficity is based on a random sample of reviews from each community.
DECEPTIVE Recall TRUTHFUL Recall
Community (sensitivity) (specificity)
Expedia 86.8% 90.3%
Hotels.com 86.8% 88.5%
Orbitz 86.8% 89.8%
Priceline 86.8% 88.5%
TripAdvisor 86.8% 84.8%
Yelp 86.8% 68.5%
(denoted η and θ, respectively) through a combination of cross-validation and
evaluation on a held-out development set.
In particular, because our training data contains gold standard DECEPTIVE
reviews, we estimate the deceptive recall of our classifier by cross-validation
on the training data. Unfortunately, our training data contains varying num-
bers of TRUTHFUL reviews from six review communities; accordingly, estimates
of the truthful recall obtained by cross-validation may be biased towards com-
munities with better representation in this training data. Therefore, we instead
estimate the truthful recall of each community’s classifier on a development
set containing a random sample of 400 positive-sentiment (5-star) reviews from
that community. We note that if the underlying (unknown) rate of deception is
high among the reviews in this development set, then we may underestimate
the specificity, and also the rate of deception for that community. We discuss
this further in Section 5.6.1.
Reference sensitivity and specificity for each community is given in Table 5.2.
We adopt an empirical Bayesian approach and use these estimates to inform the
corresponding Beta priors via their hyperparameters, β and γ, respectively. The
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full procedure is given in Appendix A.2.
5.6 Results and Discussion
Estimates of the prevalence of deception over time in six review communities,
obtained from the Bayesian Prevalence Model, are given in Figure 5.2. Blue
graphs (a–d) correspond to communities with High posting cost (see Table 5.1),
i.e., communities for which you are required to book a hotel room before posting
a review, while red graphs (e–f) correspond to communities with Low posting
cost, i.e., communities that allow any user to post reviews for any hotel.
Hypothesis 1 In agreement with Hypothesis 1 (see Section 5.4.1), we observe
that estimated rates of deception are either stationary or decreasing over time
for High posting cost review communities (blue graphs, a–d). In contrast, we
observe growth in the estimated rates of deception in review communities that
allow any user to post reviews for any hotel, i.e., Low posting cost communi-
ties (red graphs, e–f). Interestingly, communities with a blend of posting costs
appear to have intermediate rates of deception that are neither growing nor de-
clining, e.g., Hotels.com, which has a steady estimated rate of deception ≈ 2%.
Hypothesis 2 Next, we test Hypothesis 2, i.e., that increasing a community’s
posting cost will decrease the prevalence of deception in that community. Un-
fortunately, we do not have the ability to increase any of the chosen commu-
nity’s real-world posting costs. Therefore, we instead simulate an increased
posting cost by filtering reviews written by new users (i.e., first-time review
writers), or inexperienced reviewers (i.e., first- or second-time review writers).
In particular, by requiring users to post multiple reviews in order for any of
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Figure 5.2: Bayesian estimates of deception prevalence versus time, for six
online review communities. Blue (a–d) and red (e–f) graphs
correspond to high and low posting cost communities, respec-
tively. Error bars show Bayesian 95% credible intervals.
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their reviews to be displayed, we are able to simulate a retroactive increase of a
community’s posting cost. Moreover, because this increased posting cost is sim-
ulated, this approach allows us to test our hypothesis without worrying about
an “arms race” between spammers and review community operators.
We simulate this increased posting cost on our TripAdvisor data, because
TripAdvisor is the only review community for which we know the number of
reviews posted by each user. In particular, we apply our model to estimate
the prevalence of deception over time after removing reviews written by first-
time (singleton) review writers, and after removing reviews written by first- or
second-time review writers. Note that reviews are filtered based on the author’s
number of TripAdvisor reviews as of February 2012, which is approximately six
months after the end date of our dataset. Thus, at a minimum, authors of filtered
reviews did not post a sufficient number of reviews to avoid the filtering criteria
in the six months following their last review.
Bayesian Prevalence Model estimates for TripAdvisor for varying posting
costs appear in Figure 5.3. In agreement with Hypothesis 2, we see a clear reduc-
tion in the prevalence of deception over time on TripAdvisor after removing
these reviews, with rates dropping from ≈ 6%, to ≈ 5%, and finally to ≈ 4%, for
each of the three settings, respectively. This suggests that an increased posting
cost may be effective at reducing the prevalence of deception in online review
communities.
5.6.1 Assumptions and Limitations
We have made a number of assumptions in this chapter, a few of which we will
now highlight and discuss. Note that our choice of assumptions generally aim
to underestimate, rather than overestimate, rates of deception.
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(c) Reviewers with ≤ 2 reviews excluded
Figure 5.3: Bayesian estimates of the prevalence of deception on
TripAdvisor over time, when: (a) all reviews are included in
the estimate; (b) reviews written by first-time (singleton) au-
thors are excluded; and (c) reviews written by first- or second-
time authors are excluded. Excluding reviews written by new
users increases the posting cost, which is hypothesized to de-
crease the prevalence of deception.
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First, we note that our unlabeled test set, containing reviews from the six
online hotel review communities, overlaps with our TRUTHFUL training set.
Consequently, we will underestimate the prevalence of deception, because the
overlapping reviews will be more likely to be classified at test time as truthful,
having been seen in training as being truthful. Excluding these overlapping
reviews from the test set results in overestimating the prevalence of deception,
based on the hypothesis that the overlapping reviews, chosen from 20 of the
most popular Chicago hotels, are more likely to be truthful in the first place (see
the discussion in Section 2.3.1).
Second, we observe that our development set, on which we estimate our
classifier’s truthful recall, is not gold standard. And while it is necessary to
obtain a random sample of reviews in order to fairly estimate the classifier’s
truthful recall rate, such review samples are inherently unlabeled. This can be
problematic if many of the reviews in our development set are, in fact, decep-
tive, because we will then underestimate our classifier’s specificity, and therefore
underestimate the prevalence of deception as well.
Third, our proposal for increasing the signal cost, by hiding reviews writ-
ten by first- or second-time reviewers, is not perfect. While our results suggest
that hiding these reviews will cause an immediate reduction in the prevalence of
deception, the increase in posting cost may be insufficient to discourage new de-
ception, once spammers become aware of the increased posting requirements.
Fourth, we have considered a limited version of the deception prevalence
problem. In particular, we have restricted our analysis to positive Chicago hotel
reviews, and our classifier is trained to detect only crowdsourced DECEPTIVE re-
views. While these restrictions are necessary in this work, due to limitations of
our dataset, future work may expand the methodology and analysis presented
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in this chapter to other kinds of reviews, such as negative-sentiment reviews
and deceptive reviews obtained from other sources (see other possible direc-
tions for future work in Section 6.2).
5.7 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we have presented a general framework for estimating the
prevalence of deception in online review communities, based on the output of
a noisy deception classifier. Using this framework, we have explored the preva-
lence of deception among positive reviews in six popular online review commu-
nities, and provided the first empirical study of the magnitude, and influencing
factors of deceptive opinion spam.
We have additionally proposed a theoretical model of online reviews as a
signal to a product’s true (unknown) quality. Specifically, we have argued that
the prevalence of deception in a review community is a function of the posting
costs and exposure benefits of that community. Based on this theory, we have
further suggested two hypotheses, both of which are supported by our findings.
First, we find that review communities with low posting costs and high expo-
sure benefits have more deception than communities with comparatively higher
posting costs or lower exposure benefits. Second, we find that by increasing the
posting cost of a review community, i.e., by excluding reviews written by first-
or second-time reviewers, we can effectively reduce both the prevalence and the
growth rate of deception in that community.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In this dissertation, we have presented the first thorough investigation of decep-
tive opinion spam in online review communities. In this chapter, we summarize
the contributions of this work (Section 6.1), and discuss possible directions for
future work (Section 6.2).
6.1 Summary of Contributions
We have shown in Chapter 2 how deceptive opinions can be obtained quickly
and cheaply through crowdsourcing services, such as Amazon Mechanical
Turk, or from domain experts, such as hotel employees. We have addition-
ally introduced, and made publicly available,1 the first large-scale corpus of
gold standard deceptive opinion spam, containing 1,280 deceptive reviews of
hotels and restaurants, including a mix of positive-sentiment (4- or 5-star) and
negative-sentiment (1- or 2-star) deceptive opinion spam, as well as domain ex-
pert deceptive opinion spam, written by hotel employees.
We have demonstrated in Chapter 3 that crowdsourced deceptive opinion
spam is largely undetectable by human judges. We have also demonstrated that
supervised Machine Learning classifiers can be trained to detect deceptive opin-
ion spam, based on the language used in a review, with accuracies approach-
ing 90% in some experiments. We have presented results, based on the feature
weights learned by our classifiers, that illustrate the difficulties faced by liars in
encoding spatial information into their deceptive reviews, and we have shown
1The data used in this dissertation is available from: http://www.cs.cornell.edu/
˜myleott/op_spam.
95
a plausible relationship between deceptive opinion spam and imaginative writ-
ing, based on part-of-speech distributional similarities.
In Chapter 4, we have shown that individual cues to deception vary accord-
ing to the context of the review, including the sentiment and domain of the
review, and the domain expertise of the reviewer. We have found that Machine
Learning classifiers are sensitive to the context of the reviews on which they are
trained, but that classifiers trained on reviews from several contexts perform
better across contexts, compared to classifiers trained on reviews from a single
context.
In Chapter 5, we introduced an approach for estimating the prevalence of
deception in an online review community, based on the output of our Machine
Learning classifiers. We have applied our approach to six online hotel review
communities, and have presented the first empirical estimates of the prevalence
of deceptive opinion spam among online hotel reviews. We have additionally
shown that by increasing review posting costs, for example, by hiding reviews
written by new users, we can reduce the prevalence of deceptive opinion spam.
6.2 Future Directions
This section discusses several possible directions for future work.
Context-Aware Deception Classifiers We have shown that a review’s context
influences cues to deception, and therefore, the ability of Machine Learning clas-
sifiers to detect deceptive opinion spam. Future work may develop additional
techniques for handling context-specific features, potentially by directly model-
ing, or inferring, the context of the deception.
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Reducing Deception Prevalence Future work might explore other methods
for manipulating review posting costs, and the corresponding effects on decep-
tion prevalence. For example, some sites, such as Angie’s List,2 now charge a
monthly access fee in order to browse or post reviews, and future work might
study the effectiveness of such techniques at deterring deception.
Non-Experiential Product Reviews We have considered primarily reviews of
experiential products, such as hotels and restaurants. Future work might addi-
tionally explore deception in non-experiential product review domains, such as
product reviews found on Amazon.com.
Semi-Deceptive Opinion Spam There are many factors that may act to sub-
tly influence or manipulate a user’s opinion, besides the deceptions considered
here. For example, many businesses attempt to coerce customers to post reviews
with promises of discounts or other monetary incentives. Future work may try
to model the influence that such incentives have on the resulting reviews.
Review Persuasiveness We have argued that online reviews are an important
part of the modern consumer’s decision making process. However, it seems un-
likely that individual reviews are perceived as equally persuasive among con-
sumers. For example, some websites now ask users to rate whether they find
each review to be “helpful,” but a more systematic evaluation of what makes
a review persuasive, regardless of whether the review is truthful or deceptive,
may be of benefit to businesses looking to better understand and improve their
online reputations. Such an evaluation would additionally help to quantity the
value of a review, and the benefit or harm caused by deceptive reviews.
2Angie’s List: http://AngiesList.com.
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APPENDIX A
ESTIMATING THE PREVALENCE OF DECEPTIVE OPINION SPAM
A.1 Gibbs Sampler for the Bayesian Prevalence Model
Gibbs sampling of the Bayesian Prevalence Model, introduced in Section 5.3, is
performed according to the following conditional distributions:
Pr(yi = 1 | f (x), y(−i);α,β,γ) ∝ (α1 + N(−i)1 ) ·
β f (xi) + X
(−i)
f (xi)∑
β + N(−i)1
, (A.1)
Pr(yi = 0 | f (x), y(−i);α,β,γ) ∝ (α0 + N(−i)0 ) ·
γ1− f (xi) + Y
(−i)
f (xi)∑
γ + N(−i)0
, (A.2)
where,
X(−i)k =
∑
j,i
σ[y j = 1] · σ[ f (x j) = k],
Y (−i)k =
∑
j,i
σ[y j = 0] · σ[ f (x j) = k],
N(−i)1 = X
(−i)
0 + X
(−i)
1 ,
N(−i)0 = Y
(−i)
0 + Y
(−i)
1 .
After sampling, we reconstruct the collapsed variables to yield the Bayesian
Prevalence Model estimate of the prevalence of deception:
pi∗ =
α1 + N1∑
α + Ntest
. (A.3)
Estimates of the classifier’s sensitivity and specificity are similarly given by:
η∗ =
β1 + X1∑
β + N1
, (A.4)
θ∗ =
γ1 + Y0∑
γ + N0
. (A.5)
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A.2 Estimating Classifier Sensitivity and Specificity
We estimate the sensitivity and specificity of our deception classifier via the
following procedure:
1. Assume given a labeled training set, Dtrain, containing Ntrain reviews of n
hotels. Also assume given a development set, Ddev, containing labeled
truthful reviews.
2. Split Dtrain into n folds, Dtrain1 , . . . ,Dtrainn , of sizes given by, Ntrain1 , . . . ,Ntrainn ,
respectively, such that Dtrainj contains all (and only) reviews of hotel j. Let
Dtrain(− j) contain all reviews except those of hotel j.
3. Then, for each hotel j:
(a) Train a classifier, f j, from reviews in Dtrain(− j) , and use it to classify re-
views inDtrainj .
(b) Let |TP| j correspond to the observed number of true positives, i.e.:
|TP| j =
∑
(x,y)∈Dtrainj
σ[y = 1] · σ[ f j(x) = 1]. (A.6)
(c) Similarly, let |FN| j correspond to the observed number of false nega-
tives.
4. Calculate the aggregate number of true positives (|TP|) and false negatives
(|FN|), and compute the sensitivity (deceptive recall) as:
η =
|TP|
|TP| + |FN | . (A.7)
5. Train a classifier using all reviews inDtrain, and use it to classify reviews in
Ddev.
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6. Let the resulting number of true negative and false positive predictions in
Ddev be given by |TN|dev and |FP|dev, respectively, and compute the speci-
ficity (truthful recall) as:
θ =
|TN|dev
|TN|dev + |FP|dev . (A.8)
For the Bayesian Prevalence Model, we observe that the posterior distribu-
tion of a variable with an uninformative (uniform) Beta prior, after observing a
successes and b failures, is just Beta(a + 1, b + 1), i.e., a and b are pseudo counts.
Based on this observation, we set the hyperparameters β and γ, corresponding
to the classifier’s sensitivity (deceptive recall) and specificity (truthful recall),
respectively, to:
β = 〈|FN| + 1, |TP| + 1〉 ,
γ = 〈|FP|dev + 1, |TN|dev + 1〉 .
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